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t h e  press 
ALIBRANDQt Good ~ r n i n  e ready t o  begin 
conference on t h e  Apoll ion,  
The part i e i p a n t s  t h i  ill be D r .  Thomas 
Paine,  Acting Administrator; Lt. General Samuel P h l l l l ~ s ,  A P O ~ ~ O  
Program Director; and B i l l  Schneider, Apollo M i  @ion Director. 
Dr, Paine. 
PAINE: Good morning. After a c a r e f u l  and thorough 
exasinat ion of  a l l  of t h e  system and r i sks  involved, we  
have concluded t h a t  w e  are now ready to  P l y  t h e  most advanced 
miss ion  for  our  Apollo 8 launch i n  December, t h e  orbit  around 
t h e  moon. 
Frank Bornan and h i s  crew and a l l  of our  engineerrs 
are unanimously i n  favor  of s e l e c t i n g  t h i s  mission. 
We have reached t h i s  conclusion a f te r  a long series 
of in tens ive  inves t iga t ions  of t h e  s t a t u s  of our  program, the  
f l i g h t  hardware, ground support  equipment, s ta t  
t ra in ing .  
The timing for t h e  December 21 launch is conditioned 
by t h e  pos i t i on  of t he  earth and t h e  moon and the  sun. It is 
designed to g ive  us  day l igh t  i n  t h e  launch area and the  recovery 
area and then designed t o  g i v e  us  t h e  r i g h t  kind of photographic 
and observat ion l i g h t  on t h e  su r face  of the  moon. 
The outbound t r i p  w i l l  occupy about three dags,  t he  
t i m e  i n  orbit  around t h e  moon w i l l  be about a day  involving 
t e n  orbi ta l  swings around the moon, w i t h  about a three-day 
re turn ,  a c t u a l l y  adding up to something j u s t  s l i g h t l y  over  
s i x  days  to  the recovery. 
To te l l  you about the  details of t h i s  decis ion and 
now to  introduce t h e  Director of 
n e r a l  Samuel Ph i l l i p s .  
od morning, ladies a ntlemen. The 
cided to  f l y  w i t h  Ap 
as designed. And i 
it won't know the  d i  
8 is t h e  mission 
ar landing mission. 
I 
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And 
for  which the  
The 
of coume, is 
respects t h e  mission 
except ion i n  the c 10 spacecraft, 
that there is not e aboard, and 
t h e  command and s e r v i c  t r i p  t o  the 
moon without having t h  docked, and t h  t h e  exception, 
i n  most important respec of t h e  
knowledge w i l l  gain,  it is t h e  d e s i  for  t h e  
Apollo-Saturn V space s y s t e m ,  
Now, w e  have concluded, as 
the  to ta l  Apollo space ys t em w i l l  be 
a t  t h e  scheduled launch t i m e  on the 21s 
I would l i k e  to  t e some t i m e  t h i  
marize t h e  important elemen of the back 
to  t h a t  decis ion and to  d iscuss  also t h e  
c lus ian ,  
L e t  m e  start w i t h  when we flew 
Ago110 4, which consisted o 
and t h e  017 spacecraft, Th 
being t h e  f i r s t  Saturn V f l i g h t ,  
less mission. The launch vehic le  t ~ a t ~ ~  completely a l l  
of t h e  maneuvers and perf0 
the  u l t imate  lunar  landing 
A s  far t h e  launch vsh ic  
ou t  its design mission, 
The spacecraft 017 flew for nearly 11 hou 
on-board program con t ro l  and under remote con t ro l  f 
ground, and performed flawles l y ,  Among it many demonstrationrs , 
it demonstrated the high-speed reentry t h a t  is required for 
t h e  r e t u r n  f r o m  8 lunar  mission, 
Now, you can draw many concl  m t h a t  missfon, 
but one of them is t ha t  it showed t h  Saturn V 
design is a good design, 
Now, i n  Apri l  of t h i  t h e  second 
Saturn V, No. 502, which carried the  btpac t 020, t h e  
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sister s h i p  o e c  d it  Apollo 60 I t  w a s  designed 
i n  most impor ect a repeat  of the  Apollo 4 mission. 
There were on t h a t  m i s  ion  s e v e r a l  important techni- 
cal f a i l u r e s  and malfunctionsl. You w i l l  recall t h a t  during 
t h e  second-stage o engines failed. During t h e  
orbi ta l  coast an t i o n  for restart far t h e  simu- 
lated trans nar  i n j e c t i o n ,  t h e  upper stage failed to restart 
for  the  t r a  lunar  in jec t ion .  
In  t h e  post-mission ana lys i s  w e  determined t h a t  w e  
had longi tudina l  oscillations on that vehic le  which are cow 
monly called POGO, We observed also there w a s  abnormal p e r  
formance of the  propel lan t  u t i l i z a t i o n  s y s t e m  which cont ro l led  
t h e  d iv i s ion  of f u e l  and ox id ize r  i n  the  engine during t h e  
propuls ive maneuver. 
We also discussed i n  t h e  b r i e f ing  that  fQl1QWed t h a t  
mission an apparent s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  spacecraft L?d 
adapter area of t h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  We also o erved a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  
I w i l l  recall again,  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
which were s u b s t a n t i a l  and important, t he  spacecraft w a s  cow 
manded off i n t o  an a l t e r n a t e  mission by t h e  f l i g h t  control 
organizat ion and it f l  8 flawless a l t e r n a t e  mission, re- 
enter ing  i n  t he  P a c i f i c  as intended. 
Now, t h e  quest ion t h a t  one can raise then from t h i s  
series 501 and 502 r e a l l y  concerns t h e  t o t a l  adequacy of t h e  
design and of the proce 88s of manufacture and therefore of 
the margins t h a t  are a v a i l a b l e  i n  a piece of equipment, 
A f t e r  that mission we very rap id ly  assessed t h e  
technica l  data, determined by t h e  latter p a r t  of Apri l  of 
t h i s  y e a r  t h a t  w e  understood s u f f i c i e n t l y  the reason for the  
malfunctions t ha t  occurred, t h a t  w e  fel t  w e  could proceed 
w i t h  confidence to prepare the next Saturn V, No. 503, to 
carry out  a manned f l i g h t  i n  t he  lat ter p a r t  of t h i s  calendar  
year .  
Since that t i m e  there has been one of the most 
aggressive,  thorough and determined engineer ing tests and 
engineer ing ana lys i s  programs conducted t f have ever  
seen. And i n  t h e  course of these months have i d e n t i f i e d  
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i n  detail  t h e  rea Oris f o r  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
t h e   correction^. We have tasted a t  great length t h e  correc- 
tions and, in parallel wi th  a l l  t h i s ,  conducted a very elaborate 
engineering ana lys i s .  
We have designed 
This culminated week before last on the 7 th  of Novem- 
ber i n  a design certif ication review which concluded by val i -  
dat ing and c e r t i f y i n g  the  Saturn V No. 503 as ready for  
manned f l i g h t .  
L e t  m e  recall also that las t  August i n  a press confer- 
ence and briefing tha t  w e  had on the 19th of August, to  be 
specific, I ou t l ined  t h e  events  t h a t  l e d  us  t o  the decis ion 
to  drop LM 3 from the  503 f l i g h t  which w a s  being made ready 
for  f l i g h t  i n  t h e  la te  part of t h i s  y e a r .  That decis ion w a s  
reached because w e  were encountering de lays  i n  t h e  checkout 
of the  lunar  module at  t h e  Cape which i n  our  judgment w a s  lead- 
ing us to  a f l i g h t  w e l l  i n t o  t h e  sp r ing  of next y e a r  i f  w e  
were t o  w a i t  u n t i l  we resolved the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  were de- 
laying the checkout, 
A t  tha t  t i m e  w 0  concluded that it w a s  i n  the  best 
i n t e r e s t  of t he  progressl of t h e  program to  prepare the  503 
launch vehic le  to f l y  w i t h  command s e r v i c e  module 103 but 
without t h e  LM i n  order to  get the  Apollo-Saturn V s y s t e m  
i n t o  space opera t ions  a t  the earliest t i m e  and to m a k e  t h e  
gains toward our  u l t imate  ob jec t ive  of a manned lunar  landing 
by f l y i n g  y e t  t h i s  year w i t h  a command s e r v i c e  module only. 
That dec is ion  then i d e n t i f i e d  a range of a l t e r n a t i v e  
missions t h a t  we would prepare to conduct wi th  t h e  decis ion 
t o  be made after a l l  of the  pmgram events  had occurred, in- 
c luding the  f l i g h t  of A p o l l o  7 ,  which would then be t h e  basis  
for a decis ion  to select from among those range of a l t e r n a t e  
missions, which included l o w  earth orb i t ,  high earth orbi t ,  
many thousands of m i l e s  i n  orbi t ,  circumlunar or i n t o  lunar  
orbit  and r e t u r n  as t he  range of options.  
Now, Apollo 7 ,  which of coup88 f l e w  between t h e  
11th and 22nd of October, w a s  launched on a Saturn-IB and 
carried the f i r s t  Block I1 spacecraft, No. 101. That mission, 
as we a l l  know, m e t  its objec t ives ,  and I have classified it 
as a pe r fec t  mission. 
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took off been reducing 
t h e  data from you know, w e  carry many 
hundreds of i ne l s  aboard each of our  
f l i g h t s  i n  or nalyze the performance down 
s e v e r a l  l e v e l s  i n  a l l  of the  important subsystems, That 
ana lys i s  has  been ing very hard a t  the quest ion I asked 
after 1 mentioned 501 and 502 sequence -- namely, a t  t he  
design margi e8 of i n c i p i e n t  f a i l u r e s  which 
c a r e f u l  r e v i  Is of t h e  data might i nd ica t e ,  and 
a c a r e f u l  re f the performance of t h a t  spacecraft i n  its 
primary mode pera t ion  such as t h e  environmental cont ro l ,  
where it w a s  exercised thoroughly, as w e l l  as looking care- 
f u l l y  a t  t h e  perfo nce i n  the  s e v e r a l  what I w i l l  ca l l  
a l t e r n a t e  or  backoff or degraded modes of operat ion which w e  
have b u i l t  i n t o  t h i s  equipment through redundancy of design 
and by providing backdown f e a t u r e s  that  t h e  crew can select 
i n  case any of the  pieces of equipment i n d i c a t e  abnormal per- 
f ormance * 
As I s a y ,  w e  have concentrated many thousands of 
engineers '  manhours i n  s tudying t h a t  data i n  order t o  assess 
and understand design margins and the  possibilities of kncipi- 
en t  f a i l u r e s .  Bec e you recall, t h e  way i n  which t h i s  pro- 
gram has been organized from t h e  beginning, w e  have a lways  
known t h a t  w e  would never be able t o  demonstrate in a classical, 
s ta t i s t ica l  r e l i a b i l i t y  sense the  performance of the  equipment 
and the r e l i a b i l i t y  which r equ i r e s  tena or  even hundreds of 
operat ions t o  demonstrate, 
So w e  have b ad our  program from the  beginning on 
c a r e f u l  design, incorporat ing redundancies and degraded mode 
operat ion,  and then a very, very extensive ground test pro- 
gram culminated by a minimum of f l i g h t  demonstrations t o  
va l ida t e  the  design, 
Now, 1% going t o  d iscuss  i n  a few momenta two or 
three of t h e  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  work tha t  has  been done s i n c e  
that t i m e  using some vu-graphs, so I won't s a y  any more about 
it r i g h t  now. 
How, we i n  the Apollo Program have been working now 
for many y e a r s  toward the  o b j e c t i v e  of a manned lunar  landing 
a t  t h e  earliest practical and safe t i m e ,  W e  concluded back 
i n  August and have devoted much energy t o  t h e  po in t  s i n c e  
t h a t  there is much to  gain by going as deep i n t o  space w i t h  
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t h e  second manned Apollo f l i  h t  as w e  would be able t o  judge 
prudent, We are able by going i n t o  lunar  orbi t  t o  make an 
early f l i g h t  d e ~ ~ t r a t i o n  f t h e  design mission of the  
Saturn V and of the  Apollo command and s e r v i c e  module space- 
craft and to understand the operat ion of t h e  spacecraft i n  
t h e  thermal environment of t r ans luna r  space and i n  t h e  environ- 
ment surrounding t h e  moon, t o  assess our  communications capa- 
b i l i t y ,  and very importantly t o  eva lua te  and work on our  
navigat ion capabili ty,  
In  t h i s  connection, our  a b i l i t y  to  iden t i fy  and 
track landmarks on t h e  lunar  su r face  is very important to  
t h e  precise orbit determinat ion which w e  expect t o  be able 
to  accomplish i n  order t o  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  accuracy make t h e  
landing w i t h  t h e  lunar  module and then make t h e  rendezvous 
between the  lunar  module and t h e  command s e r v i c e  module after 
t h e  lunar  landing, 
W e  are also very aware of t h e  gains  that  w e  can 
make by e a r l y  development and evaluat ion of t h e  procedures 
t h a t  are involvedl in  t h e  luna r  mission, those concerned w i t h  
f l i g h t  con t ro l  i n  our  Mission Con t ro l  Center as w e l l  as 
around the  world,  and, very importantly,  our  i n f l i g h t  pro- 
cedures. 
Now, whi le  w e  have known and given much a t t e n t i o n  to  
t h e  gains  that can be made by proceeding out  to lunar  orbi t ,  
w e  have also recognized t h a t  i n  car ry ing  ou t  such a mission 
w e  take on some add i t iona l  r i s k s  over  and above those t h a t  
one exposes himeelf to or t h e  f l i g h t  crew t o  operat ing i n  a 
l o w  earth orbit .  But  w e  have been able to-- I t  is our  con- 
c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  progression of riskrr which w e  have known 
from t h e  beginning t h a t  w e  have to undertake as w e  take on 
more and more of our  complex sys tem leading to  t h e  lunar  
landing- We have judged that t h e  progression of r i s k  be- 
tween t h e  A p o l l o  7 mission which we have flown and the  
Apollo 8 mission which w e  have designed is a normal progres- 
s i o n  of r i s k s  i n  a logically stepped development, f l i g h t  test 
program. 
In  the  case of the  luna r  orbit  mission, you can 
summarize these new r i s k s  i n  two categories. 3n t h e  one 
category, t he  spacecraft propul ion sys t em m u s t  operate p r o p e r  
l y  i n  order t o  propel t he  spacecraft back ou t  of luna r  orbit 
and on its way back to  earth. And t h e  other category of 
r i s k s  are those t h a t  are inherent  i n  being some three days 
away from the earth as oppoaed to  somewhere between a half 
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an hour and three hour 
earth i n  a l o w  earth o 
i ch  t h e  crew is away from t h e  
So i n  t h i s  case w e  have to  place increased r e l i a n c e  
on t h e  dependabi l i ty  of the  l i f e  support  s y s t e m  and the  
electric power s y s t e m  i n  main. 
Now, what I would l ike to  do now is summarize for 
you using some vu-graphs some of the high p o i n t s  of t h e  tech- 
n i c a l  and ope ra t iona l  reviews which have gone on day  after day 
i n  great depth over  t h e  last s e v e r a l  months to  g i v e  you some 
feel for  the  depth of t h e  cons idera t ion  t h a t  has  gone i n t o  
t h i s  decision. 
I * m  going to j u s t  show two charts t h a t  concern t h e  
launch vehicle .  And let  m e  po in t  o u t  i n  t h a t  connection 
tha t  t h e  launch veh ic l e  per s0 is r e a l l y  not  involved i n  t h e  
dec is ion  procese of whether w e  go i n t o  earth o r b i t  or carry 
out  a mission involving ope ra t ions  around t h e  moon. 
The dec is ion  that w e  j u s t  laat week va l ida t ed  is t h e  
one which s a y s  t h a t  t h e  Sa turn  V is indeed ready t o  conduct a 
manned f l i g h t .  And the two most important t e c h n i c a l  f a i l u r e s  
on 502 were t h e  f a i l u r e s  of t he  52 engine on t h e  second and 
t h i r d  stages and t h e  long i tud ina l  o s c i l l a t i o n  for POGO. 
What w e  d i d  following that w a s  to set up a test program i n  
which w e  were able to  very precisely reproduce t h e  condi t ions  
of t h e  f a i l u r e  on t h e  engines,  which 681118 down to a f a i l u r e  
of t h e  s m a l l  l i n e  whiph feeds hydrogen i n t o  t he  starter cup 
of t h e  52 engine. 
This i a J  t h e  o l d  l i n e  deerign and t h e  weakness w a s  i n  
two f lexible  j o i n t s  t h a t  were g u t  there to absorb v i b r a t i o n s  
and the  changes involved as t h e  engine operated. 
I t  took some f a i r l y  b r i l l i a n t  d e t e c t i v e  work to 
i d e n t i f y  t h e  fact that a f l o w  v i b r a t i o n  phenomenon w a s  set 
up i n  these l i n e s  under d r y  vacuum condi t ions  which had not  
been discovered i n  t h e  ground t e s t i n g ,  because i n  t h e  f i n a l  
a n a l y s i s  it turned o u t  t ha t  the ground test s e t u p  conducted 
i n  either ambient a i r  condi t ions  or i n  t h e  blowdown t y p e  
vacuum facilities i n  which one tests big engines allowed 
moisture  f r o m  t h e  a i r  to  freeze out on these f lexible  j o i n t s  
and t o  change t h e  s t i f f n e s s  therefore the v b r a t i o n  character- 
istics. 
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Operating i n  t he  vacuum of pace, the  moi s tu re  
condensation on t h e  extremely cold l i n e s  d i d  not occur. 
The v ibra t ion  characteristics were s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  The 
v ib ra t ion  caused cracking,  and under t h e  pressures  involved 
i n  feeding hydrogen i n t o  t h i s  u n i t ,  these j o i n t s  cracked and 
broke and r e su l t ed  then i n  the  f a i l u r e s  of t h e  engine and 
t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  restart of t h e  5-IVB stage. 
T h i s  l i n e  was redesigned and I might Bay over- 
designed i n  t h e  process, 
and bends i n  the tube were s u b s t i t u t e d  t o  take up t h e  motions. 
These were subjected to  extensive overdesign t e s t i n g ,  were 
v e r i f i e d  as more than adequate to  correct the  problem. 
The flexible j o i n t s  were taken ou t ,  
The new design w also incorporated i n  t he  oxygen 
s i d e  of the  engine start  s y s t e m ,  and it d i d  f l y  on t h e  
S-IVB stage of launch vehic le  205 which propelled Apollo 7 
i n t o  o r b i t .  
So i n  add i t ion  t o  extensive ground t e s t i n g ,  it has 
now been used once i n  manned f l i g h t .  
The next  chart is a summary of t h e  POGO s i t u a t i o n  
i n  one of t h e  impcrtant ways i n  which one measures t h e  margins 
of t h e  equipment. And t h i s  is one of t h e  summar$es which w a s  
used i n  t he  design c e r t i f i c a t i o n  review on t h e  7 t h  of November 
t o  summarize s e v e r a l  hours of t echn ica l  discussion,  and it is 
t h e  r e s u l t  of many thousands of manhours of work involving 
many companies tha t  w e  called on t o  help us, 
The mode that got u s  i n t o  d i f f i c u l t y  on 502 w a s  
t h e  first longi tudina l  mode of the vehic le  aa it  crossed t h e  
W X  l i n e  frequency which w a s  up very close, and a c t u a l l y  o u t  
around 90 seconds it became marginal as far as s t a b i l i t y  is 
concerned. 
The cor rec t ion  t h a t  h been made is t o  use t h e  pre- 
valve c a v i t i e s  of t h e  W X  l i n e s  88 accumulators, and w e  i n j e c t  
helium i n t o  those to provide a spr ing- l ike  characteristic 
to the  UIX column, And those accumulators are incorporated 
i n  the four  outboard c o n t r o l  engines on the f i r s t  stage of 
t h e  Saturn V, 
And by so doing, the first mode t a t  got US i n t o  
t roub le  on 502 is completely off t h i s  chart. This ordinate 
is the  loop gain i n  phase measured i n  decibels,  and t h e  
criteria w e  have set for  ourselves  after the 502 f l i g h t  W a S  
J 
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to  achieve a s t a b i l i t y  margin of approximately 6 decibels.  
Now, a8 I s a i d ,  t he  mode t h a t  got us  i n  t roub le  
on 502 is completely off t h e  chart. It is more than 30 db's 
of margin of s t a b i l i t y .  
And w e  plotted here a l l  t he  higher modes up through 
t h e  n in th  mode. And here is the s i x t h ,  seventh,  e ighth and 
n in th  tract along here, The fou r th  comes i n  here a t  t h i s  
point .  T h i s  is f l i g h t  t i m e  i n  seconds. 
And as the vehic le  propel lan ts  deplete, the mode 
gains change. And you can see here t h a t  t h e  t h i r d  made comes 
i n  late i n  t h e  f l i g h t  and then tailed off. And t h e  second 
mode starts up s i g h t  a t  t h e  outboard engine cu to f f ,  This 
was the  shutdown of t h e  stage. T h i s  symbol  is where t h e  
Saturn engine c u t s  off, and a t  about 150 seconds the  stage has 
f in i shed  its job. 
So by combination of much t e s t i n g  that  w a s  acccomp- 
l ished i n  s e v e r a l  facilities, a great deal of engineering 
ana lys i s  work, and f i n a l l y  s y s t e m  t e s t i n g  on S I C  test stage 
No. 6 and 7 i n  Mississippi, i n  which t h i s  design change w a s  
incorporated,  w e  have concluded beyond doubt t h a t  w e  have a 
very adequate margin against POGO recur r ing  on any subsequent 
f l i g h t  , 
Now, I recalled t h a t  one of our t echn ica l  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  on t h e  502 f l i g h t  w a s  an apparent s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  
i n  t he  spacecraft Lllil adapter area of the ~ t r u c t u r e .  That 
sub jec t  too has received a great deal of test and ana lys i s ,  
and w e  have concluded beyond any doubt that  t he  cause of- 
We have concluded beyond doubt that there w a s  a sheet of 
aluminum that  peeled off,  t h a t  that w a s  one of t h e  facing 
sheets o f  the  bonded s t r u c t u r e ,  t ha t  t h e  r e w o n  it peeled 
off was because of an area on t h e  o u t e r  fac ing  s h e e t  where 
the  aluminum s k i n  bond t o  the  honeycomb w a s  not adequate, 
an area of something equal  to or greater than about t e n  
square inches,  and as the  veh ic l e  climbs i n t o  t h e  upper atmos- 
phere it is subjected t o  aerodynamic hea t ing  which raises the 
temperature, and, of course,  it i s  s u b j e c t  t o  pressure  change 
of t h e  ou t s ide  air. And w e  have concluded t h a t  moist air 
trapped i n  t he  honeycomb heated as it climbed, t h a t  there 
w a s  a pressure  rise i n s i d e  the  honeycomb aa you measure it 
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to  t h e  outs ide  ambient condi t ion,  t ha t  the pressure  rise 
w a s  s u f f i c i e n t  to cause f u r t h e r  debonding, which had started 
wi th  a s m a l l  debonded sec t ion ,  and enough debonding occurred 
then that t h e  aerodynamic forces peeled off a sheet of 
aluminum. 
You w i l l  recall that the s t r u c t u r a l  margins of 
tha t  design were adequate even so, t h a t  after some load relief 
occurred when the  facing sheet peeled off,  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  re- 
balanced itself and t h e  vehic le  continued without subsequent 
f a i l u r e .  
I think that is one of the  meaeures, i nc iden ta l ly ,  
of design margins that  w e  build i n  to  t h e  s y s t e m  i n  many 
waya . 
Since that tine, f r o m  a great deal of t e s t i n g ,  w e  
have now gone to an u l t r aaon ic  inajlpection of t h e  honeycomb 
s t r u c t u r e  a t  t he  Cape, ver i fy ing  that  there are no debonded 
areas i n  that s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  are 88 big as one square inch, 
which is wi th in  the  to le rance  allowable. And i n  addi t ion  to 
that,  w e  have d r i l l e d  q u i t e  a number of holes on t he  inner  
facing sheet to vent the  honeycomb. And i n  add i t ion  to  tha t ,  
w e  have put  a t h i n  l a y e r  of cork around t h e  o u t e r  s t r u c t u r e  
to  minimdae t h e  temperature rise. So I think that t h a t  prob- 
l e m  is more than corrected, and I won't s a y  any more about it. 
I would l i ke  now to go on to  diecussl a facet of 
t he  Apollo 7 mission that is critical and important i n  t he  
decis ion w e  have made t o  carry o u t  t he  luna r  orbit  mission. -- namely, g e t t i n g  to the  margirw with which w e  be l ieve  w e  
have covered ourselves  i n  our  spacecraft sysltems. 
The next  chart. 
Many of you w i l l  recall that a t  three t i m e s  dur ing 
the  Apollo 7 f l i g h t  there were repor t s  of AC bus dropoute, 
This occurred a t  something l i k e  19 hours i n t o  the mission for 
the f i r s t  time. Of those three inc idents  of AC bus f a i l u r e s ,  
i f  you want t o  use that term, in two cwes one bus dropped 
off or failed, and i n  one case both buses failed. I n  a l l  
three cases the crew w a s  able to  reset the  breaker t h a t  had 
tripped, and the  AC power came back on. 
I w i l l  only poin t  ou t  that the  way the spacecraft 
is designed there are two AC busses, bus No. 1 and bus No. 2. 

12 
There are three inve r t e r s ,  Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 
Now, t h e  i n v e r t e r s  are dr iven from the  DC bus, 
and t h e i r  funct ion is to  convert  28-volt DC i n t o  three-  
phase l l 5 v o l t  AC. Any one of the three i n v e r t e r s  can be 
on either of t h e  buses. The normal opera t ion  is t o  have one 
i n v e r t e r  on bus 1, another  i n v e r t e r  on bus 2,  and a t h i r d  
i n v e r t e r  of f  t h e  l i n e  and i n  standby s t a t u s .  
These i n v e r t e r s  power t h e  r o t a t i n g  machinery of 
t h e  spacecraf t ,  and a l l  of t h e  s y s t e m s  tha t  are powered are 
powered off of both buses. So you have got redundancy i n  
terms of supply equipment from either bus and from any one 
of three inverters .  
The spacecraft can be operated w i t h  only one bus 
and only one i n v e r t e r ,  so you have got a three-mode degrada- 
t i o n  t h a t  is possible here. 
I would point  o u t  t h a t  s e v e r a l  cri t ical  system 
operate o f f  AC -- for  example, t h e  s t a b i l i e a t i o n  and c o n t r o l  
s y s t e m  -0 and you do have to be able to  stabilize and con t ro l  
t o  carry out  t h e  maneuvers t ha t  are involved i n  an earth 
orbi ta l  mission o r  i n  any of the  more ambitious missions, 
The d r i v e  for t h e  gimbal motors on the  spacecraft 
engine is powered by AC, so you have got to have AC t o  
con t ro l  t h e  spacecraft and t o  carry ou t  s e v e r a l  of t h e  kotat'ing 
machinery dr iven funct ions l i k e  pumps and so on. 
W i l l  you put on the  next chart? 
Our people were able during the  f l i g h t  t o  corelate 
bus dropouts i n  the  AC s y s t e m  w i t h  switching funct ions of 
turning off the  heat i n  the  cryogenic tanks. This  is 
symbology that shows the  cryogenic oxygen tank t h a t  is carried 
i n  t he  s e r v i c e  module. There are two tanks, and there is 
redundancy. You have to supply heat i n  these tanks i n  order 
to  maintain t h e  pressure  which expels t he  oxygen for use by 
t h e  f u e l  cells and for dr iv ing  it up i n t o  t h e  command module 
for  l i f e  support .  The heat is suppl ied by redundant means, 
i n  the  one case by an electric heater which is powered off 
of t h e  DC bus, and the  redundant s y s t e m  is a fan  which also 
can furn ish  heat. It is put  i n  there to  avoid s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  
of t h e  cryogens, but i t  also pu t s  i n  heat. Now, t h a t  fan is 
u;; I 
m 
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driven off the  AC bus. 
In t h e  automatic s y s t e m ,  which is the  normal mode 
of operat ion and t h e  mods t h a t  Apollo 7 took off i n ,  a pres- 
s u r e  sensor i n  the  cryogenic tank s i g n a l s  a motor switch 
i f  t h e  pressure drops below a c e r t a i n  l eve l .  That motor 
switch then closes and br ings -- when you are i n  t h e  automatic 
pos i t i on  wi th in  t h e  cockpit 1- brings DC power off t h e  DC bus 
to  the heater, br ings AC power off t h e  i n v e r t e r  bus t o  power 
t h e  fan. This is the redundancy fea tures .  
Now, when t h e  pressure is built  up to prescribed 
l e v e l ,  the  motor swi tch  is signaled t o  t u r n  off and drops 
t h e  load both from t h e  DC bus and from t h e  inver te r .  
Now, one of t h e  f e a t u r e s  of the  AC s y s t e m  is an 
AC voltage sensor t h a t  is pic tured  here which powerre a t r i p  
relay which i n  the  case of an overvol tage coming o u t  of t h e  
i n v e r t e r  t r i p s  t h e  i n v e r t e r  off the bus so you have an AC 
f a i l u r e .  And t h i s  then is fed to the caut ion  and warning 
panel so t h e  crew is aware immediately of t h e  AC bus f a i l u r e .  
And i n  t h e  three events  i n  Apollo 7 t h e  crew re- 
set t h e  breaker and AC power picked up. 
Now, t h i s  co re l a t ion  W ~ E I  made during A p o l l o  7 ,  and 
t h e  suspicion a t  t h a t  t i m e  was tha t  as the  AC load w a s  dropped 
off t h e  bus, t he  overvol tage t r i p  sensor s e n s i t i v i t y  w a s  such 
t h a t  t h e  vol tage r+se\that occurs when you drop load off the  
bus w a s  enough to  t r i p  t h i s  and drop t h e  i n v e r t e r  off t h e  bus. 
So for the balance of t h e  Apollo 7 mission w e  set 
up such t h a t  one of the  systew was lef t  i n  automatic,  t h e  
other w a s  set up i n  manual, so that  w e  d idn ' t  have a dropping 
of both loads a t  t h e  same time. And after s e t t i n g  up that  
way, t h i s  d i d  not recur  i n  the  Apollo 7 mission. 
Now, after the  mission w e  got back to  t h e  command 
module, of course,  which included t h e  i n v e r t e r  and the  sensing 
c i r c u i t s ,  d i d  not  include t h e  motor switch or t h e  cryogenic 
tanks which are i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  module and therefore didn ' t  
come back to  us* 
The next  chart shows a post-f l ight  test s e t u p  where 
w e  took t h e  101 spacecraft a t  Downey, set it up w i t h  its 
4 
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i n v e r t e r s  and its electrical s y s t e m  i n  a normal mode, put 
a direct cur ren t  pmer supply on of impedance characteristics 
to  match t h e  f u e l  cell supply,  and put t h i s  motor switch,  a 
motor s w i t c h ,  i n t o  a vacuum b e l l  j a r ,  because it is i n  
vacuum i n  the  f l i g h t  environment, and set up a s t imula t ion  of 
t h e  f an  and the  heater. 
We were able i n  t h i s  test s e t u p  then to  f i n d  t h a t  
t h i s  motor swi t ch  which is protected aga ins t  moisture  i n t r u s t i o n  
but is not vacuum protected, has the  motor open the  contac ts ,  
i f  the  condi t ions of outgassing were exactly r i g h t  i n  t he  
vacuum environment, would cause arc ing  a t  t h e  switch contac ts ,  
a corona discharge t y p e  effect i n  a near  vacuum, and under 
c e r t a i n  condi t ions t h e  a rc ing  would occur t o  the case, put an 
e x t r a  load on the inve r t e r  and thereby cause the  dropout. 
The next chart shows some of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  
t e s t i n g  where, depending on t he  details of t h e  number of hours 
t h a t  t h e  swi t ch  had been exposed to  t h e  vacuum and therefore 
t h e  outgassing of t h e  p ro tec t ive  materials and therefore t h e  
exact  state of t h e  vacuum i n  t h e  case, i n  one case a t  one p a r  
t i c u l a r  l e v e l  t he  t r a n s i e n t  t h a t  occurred w a s  very small, 
didn ' t  h i t  t h e  overvol tage t r i p .  
charge there w a s  a s l i g h t  overvol tage and then recoverye 
This is a t  t h e  time t h e  corona discharge occurs  i n  t h e  s w i t c h  
contac ts  i n  t h e  case. I t  didn ' t  d rop  it out.  
Under a s l i g h t  corona dis- 
But when the vacuum condi t ions and the  number of 
molecules a t  t h e  switch case were j u s t  r i g h t ,  then a more 
severe  corona discharge occurred and cawed actually t h e  
AC voltage i n  t h e  corona discharge to  the  switch case to  
put  on overload on t h e  i n v e r t e r  and to drop It off the  l i n e .  
Now, we're fo r tuna te  i n  this case t h a t  w e  were able 
to precisely reproduce the  Conditions a9ter w e  had got t h e  
bulk of the  hardware back from the  f l i g h t .  We are also 
fo r tuna te  that  it is no procedural  d i f f i c u l t y  to not use 
t he  automatic f e a t u r e  of t h i s  cryogenic tank heat ing s y s t e m  
that these motor switches were put  in there to dr ive.  So 
w e  have introduced i n t o  our  procedures already for t h e  sub- 
sequent f l i g h t s  manual con t ro l s  of t he  pressure  of t h e  heat- 
ing and therefore t h e  p re s su r i za t ion  of the  cryogenic tanks 
and have el iminated t h i s  problem as a problem. 
Now, other than t h i s ,  which w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  and 
important,  on which w e  have been able to  reach an e n t i r e l y  
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adequate technic  he i n v e r t e r s  
and the  AC s y s t  
cated very 
con t ro l  chara 
over t h a t  one only t o  s h o w  you an example 
of an abnormal condi t ion t h a t  occurred on t h e  Apollo 7 
f l i g h t  which ere able to c or t h a t  f l i g h t ' s  pur- 
n able to  reso ofar 88 t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
erations is eo 
l d  l ike  to  t a l k  a ther  class of t h ing  
which w e  re ed i n  great depth t an example, I 
have mentioned, and it's o b v i o u ~ ,  t h a t  t he  spacecraft engine,  
t h e  some 20,000 pound t h r u s t  s e r v i c e  propulsion s y s t e m  engine 
on t h e  service module, is used to  provide t h e  engine for 
lunar  o r b i t  i n s e r t i o n  and then for transearth i n j e c t i o n  to 
g e t  us  back out  of lunar  o rb i t  on the  way home, If it 
d i d n f t  work to  get  us i n t o  lunar  o rb i t ,  we would l i k e  a luna r  
pass, But once w e  are i n  lunar  o rb i t  i t  has got to work t o  
g e t  us  ou t ,  
In an earth orbi ta l  mission,  as you know, we have 
during most of Gemini, and w e  d i d  i n  Apollo 7 ,  maintained 
t h e  capabi l i ty  t o  provide retrograde energy for deorbit using 
the  reaction con t ro l  sys t em.  Once you get o u t  i n  lunar  orbi t ,  
you don't have t h a t  fallback or backup capabi l i ty ,  and you are 
depending on the  s e r v i c e  propuls ion sys t em.  
Now, from t h e  beginning, t he  importance of t h i s  
s y s t e m  w a s  recognized and was provided for i n  t h e  design, 
The design is a simple design and is highly redundant, There 
ie only one part of t he  engine which is r e a l l y  a s t r u c t u r a l  
part that  is not  redundant, T h a t  is t he  t h r u s t  chamber and 
t h e  i n j e c t o r  t h a t  pu t s  the propel lan ts  i n t o  the t h r u s t  chamber 
and t h e  engine nozzle, And because it's not  redundant, it 
has wide factors of s a f e t y  and s t r e n g t h  margins which have 
been tested elaborately and extensively over  the  y e a r s  i n  
many normal and many abnormal opera t ing  condi t ions,  
Now, t h e  reat of t h e  s y s t e m  is highly redundant. 
You obBerve here t h e  pr0 
the  propel lan t  is redund s which 
are each isolatable f r o m  the other -- i s o l a t i o n  valves. 
r e s s u r i z e s  
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d check valves  are a l l  
e check valves  are quad- 
redundant. 
This hePi r i z ~ t i o n  s y s t e m  pre s u r i z e s  t h e  
f u e l  tank by e 
and pushes fue and i n t o  t h e  engine,  
area which p res su r i zes  
t h e  contro1 s a l v e  is also redundant, quad- 
is e%empli~ied hers ,  
schematic of the pres su r i za t ion  s y s t e m ,  
dundant c o n t r o l  valves  which oper- 
ne h i g h = t e ~ ~ e r ~ t u ~ e  condi t ion 
ator operated marginally,  
might po in t  o u t  here i n  o u r  
Th i s  w a s  found some t i m e  ago i n  ground t e s t i n g ,  and 
reason w e  d i d  change out  the engine and its valve sy 
which is called i n t e  ral on the 103 spacecraft, after our  
decis ion t o  prepare o ~ r s e l ~ e ~  for t h e  range of opt iona l  m i s -  
s i o n s  t h a t  1 have described, 
e -0 1 guss t h e  most important 
t f o n  tha t  w e  too , I t  is the 
cover ourselves  for  a l l  options, 
hated our  i t u a t i o n  back 
i n  August, 
NQW, t h e  s hieh  cont ro l led  t h e  
f u e l  and ox id ize r  i n t p  t n j e e t o r  and t h r u s t  chamber are 
series-redundant ih each e, and then i n  a loop that i s n * t  
shown here another  p s ~a~~~~ for each f u e l  and 
oxid izer ,  which therefore ad-redundant. 
So you can s u ~ ~ e r  valve failures of open or closed 
i n  t h i s  quad-redundant sehp and still be able to  either 
s t a r t  or s top  the  engine, 
Next chart, 
"here is a 1 i t h  t h i s  engine now, 
Th i s  summarizes eng?lne n to  u n i t s  of a l una r  
orbit  Gprima miss ion  where t 
w i l l  r equ i r e  for  a lunar  o 
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On 
me for t h i  
a minute i n  duration. 
w e  c o ~ d ~ c t e d  
f l f g h t  twtg -- three uni 
In a ground ta ten we are 
going to f l y  e have 86 m 
opesating t i  
In the ground t a  
back into the Block I -- 
s igni f icant  deaign chang 
of 135 uni ts  of rniererion o p ~ ~ ~ t i n g  t i m e ,  
the next ohotr 
atwe6 of hyper 
For the G p r i  
sat isf ied with  the s t ~ c t u r a ~  1y i f  it atarte  
it will run. 
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t h e  SP8. 
absolutely flawless performance, not an anoParly anywhere. 
Review of a l l  the data from Apollo 7 indicate8 
In  t h e  unmanned test preceding Apollo 7 ,  w e  had t h e  
equivalcbnt of two and a q u a r t e r  t i m a  miesion d u ~ a t ~ o n .  
fa I d e n t i c a l  system tmted on the ground, w e  have 
And aimilar aystema which incorporate  t he  ap- 280 starter. 
plicable parts of Block I experience, 517. 
One of t h e  messages here is -- what I 8aid  i n  the 
beginnang 0- that our  design coneepts lean heavi ly  on d 
ing w i t h  t h e  necerssary redundancy and in t eg ra t ed  mode f 
then  thorough testing on the  ground, and minimum f l i g h t  dentom- 
s t r a t i o n .  This exemplif ies  that. 
Next chart now. 
One oi the  thin- about a rocket engine that one 
ha# to  be aure  of 16 aombustion e t a b i l i t y ,  We have in t h  
spacecraft enginerr -- and 1 say "theme" becaw. it applies 
a180 to a l l  of the launch vehiclerr 81 well arr the lunar 
m d u l e  engines -- demonstrated rutable engine. 
In  recent  montha we have conducted 167 bomb terrt 
i n t o  an engine rhAle it is running to 
he engine go- unutable or the  premrrure 
uced dmps itrelf Out, md if it dapaPr, 
w i t h  t h i s  engine. "hie is t h e  mean8 by which teeters i n t  
dace pressure sp 
see whether or 
spike t h a t  is i 
itself ou t  in a mi l l i aewnds ,  which is the  apecifi 
then you have got a stable en$ine, became you t r y  t o  
it uns tab le  and it recover&8. 
It under a variety of t c w t  condi t  
i v e  chamber M Well M the .tee1 c r -- 
has been proven to be a mor 
r-nominal mixture ratlorr, t 
t '  
and prerserures, and it l a  a stable engins, 
For t h i s  reason w e  don't have to  have a f l i g h t  eo 
bustion s t a b i l i t y  monitor nor a rough cornbutution cu to f f  
s y s t e m  i n  thiru t~ys tem,  
Next chart. 
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Now, that l a s t  
a s  to say Apollo 
asion here t 
receded t h i  
control facil- 
~ ~ ~ e ~ s a r y  -- to be sure 
hat X have s of the things 
Dr. Pailne -- major functio 
er computer 
T h i s  complex can 
~ j @ c t i o n  ma 
the ~ i d c o u r  
unctions invo 
e nominal m 
f l f g h t  path, m 
I t  computes t 
to p r o ~ i ~ ~  9 r  a free return 
y e  I t  can p 
moon. The lunar orbit 
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i n  t h e  ground-based comp 
the  spacecraft to be exec 
maneuvers . 
8s. It 
h injee-  
y maneuvers. 
a lunar  mission 
one has to ccura te ly  . B i l l  
w i l l  have m 
spacecraft where to p 
for its own on-board p l a t  
And it can 
s a r y  it can par~s up t o  the e 
platform for  i n e r t i a l  space 
doesn't have to go through t 
of t h e  m i s -  
s i o n  using a v a r ~ e t y  of 
dopp ler da Fl ight  network. 
d three-way 
Now,  ve gone t h  gh has  been 
I t  has been re f ined  now for in development 
use on t h e  Gpr iss ion.  Formal t e s t i n g  w i l l  
be complete on t h e  9 t h  of D e c ~ b e r .  
They have by t is t i m e  completed s i m u l a t i o ~  using 
t h e  computer complex and t h e  
t h e  maneuvers t ha t  are i n v o ~  i n  t h e  lunar  orbit  mission. 
acecraft and crew of a l l  of 
The next -chart. 
Now1 t h i s  is the  8 a r y  of the  major func t iona l  
capabilities of the an-board computer program. 
d i g i t a l  program that is 
navigat ion computer. W e  call  it t h e  Colossus Program. In  
T h i s  is t h e  
tored i n  the on-board guidance and 
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t h a t  program are the f ea tu res  t h a t  allow t h e  crew on t h e i r  
on-board d isp lays  t o  monitor the  launch, t o  n i t o r  t h e  trans- 
earth i n j e c t i o n  maneuver, and t o  be able to  
execute i f  required 0- t h i s  is t h e  inde 
the  spacecraft from the  earth if fallbac 
s a r y  0- to  execute and monitor midcours 
maintain the path to the moon o r  back, 
on board t h e  lunar  orbi t  i n s e r t i o n   maneuver^ plan,  target, 
and monitor for the  t r ansea r th  in j ec t ion ,  
So there is on-board capabili ty i n  ependent of t h e  
ground to  compute g e t t i n g  i n t o  lunar  orbit  o r  coming back 
out  of lunar  orbit .  
In addi t ion ,  crews have chart block data l i k e  
t h e y  have carried on a l l  the  manned f i t h  which inde- 
pendent of computers they can ge t  a 
The on-board computer can a e for  r e e n t r y  
guidance and for platform alfgnment u tar  s i g h t i n g  and 
for  navigat ion using s tar  or  horizon ngs and lunar  
landmark t racking,  
Now, the  f l i g h t  ropes t he  piece of mechan- 
i s m  that  a11 of t h i s  d i g i t a l  p 
del ivered to  the Cape on the  14th of 
i n t eg ra t ion  test between t h e  space v 
facil i t ies w a s  performed oh t he  29th 
f l i g h t  readiness  review and t h e  c u s t  
review were concluded s a t i s f a c t o r i l  
So the  on-board program has been de  
of time and f u l l y  checked out and d 
ver  a long per iod 
Next chart. 
Now, le t  m e  j u s t  supuaarize fore w e  g i v e  a 
f u r t h e r  desc r ip t ion  of t he  mission it a t  w e  have con- 
cluded are t h e  ga ins  to  be made toward our ob jec t ive  of 
a manned lunar  landing f r o m  a lunar  orbit  mission, 
As I said before, there are many th ings  w e  can ' t  
do i n  earth orbit. W e  have got to get ou t  i n t o  space and get 
i n t o  the lunar  environment to  do many of t h e  th ings  that are 
required i n  connection w i t h  t h e  landing itself, One of these 
is navigat ion,  going out,-  i n  o rb i t ,  and coming back. And 
Z 
0 - 
v) 
v) 
3 
ow z 
2 
0 
OL 
L1, 
kt! 
e- - v) m 
(1s 
0 
3 
RmJ W 
v) ar 
z 
3 
9.J 
a 
z 
0 
CY 
LI 
W 
u) 
Z - t 0 (1s - 0 t3 z 
(3 - 
#- 
I 
c3 - x a 
S 
0 
- I- s - 
> 
4 z 
e 
.J 
0 w 
I 
t- 
22 
involved there are ' t he  l i g h t i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  which are an 
important element of determining o u r  launch window, 
In  other word@, w e  need t h e  l i g h t i n g  on t h e  l u n a r  
surface where w e  in tend  to  land a t  a f a i r l y  Xow sun  angle  
t o  eva lua te  ou r  on-board computation a b i l i t y  of t h e  guidance 
and navigat ion s y s t e m  and o u r  a b i l i t y  t o  track accura te ly  
the  targets on either horizon o r  s ta r  o r  on luna r  surface, 
These are a l l   unction u i r ed  i n  t h e  navigat ion process. 
a t  luna r  d i s tance ,  It's to  
een t h e  spacecraft and t h e  
of s i g n a l  gain,  d i s ~ a n c e s ,  point- 
ing accuracies ,  and so on. 
And the nee of o u r  h i ~ h a g a i n  and of ou r  non- 
d i r e c t i o n a l  antenn 
ined, i nc iden ta l ly ,  and discussed 
d do if the  h i  gain antenna d idn ' t  
e have had som evelopment d i f f i c u l t y  
f i c i e n t  s tate of 
h t h i s  mission w i t h  cow 
~ ~ e n n ~  i  t h e  case it  
nt, you will recall i n  
e ~ ~ l u a t e  the so-called 
ng or tumblin 
ate, insofar 
only by opera t ing  i n  t h a t  
experience tha t  is d i r e c t l y  
ng mission t h a t  w e  o b t a i n  and 
p toward t h e  more complex 
ylng t h e  l u n a r  module and w i t h  more 
h, w e ' l l  have less t i m e  and less pro- 
e margins and so on to  be able to  
very importantly v e r i f y  t h a t  o u r  mission 
~ ~ a n n i n g  , computer programs, that  o u r  crew procedures 
both on the  ground and i n  f l i g h t  and o u r  crew t i m e  l i n e s  
provide adequately for more complex operations ahead. 
Next chart. 
Now, as I have s a i d ,  there are added r i s k s  as w e  get 
away f r o m  proximity to t h e  earth. The minimum r e t u r n  t i m e  is 
considerably longer  than  it is for an earth orbi ta l  mission. 
W e  w i l l  be of t h e  order of three d a y s  away from land as com- 
pared w i t h  the prior manned f l i g h t  where w e  have been of the  
order of half  an hour t o  three hours away f r o m  r e t u r n  to 
earth. 
This  then places need for increased r e l i a n c e  on 
t h e  p r i n c i p a l l y  two major subsys te  l i f e  support ,  which 
supports  p re s su r i za t ion  and oxygen for human s u r v i v a l ,  and 
electrical power which provides for t h e  opera t ion  of t h e  
many systems aboard. And t h e  s e r v i c e  propul ion  s y s t e m  which 
must work to  come out  of luna r  o rb i t .  
Next chart. 
W e  have done a caref of t h e  r i s k s  t h a t  
are involved i n  t h i s  mission -- i n  rds, t h e  del ta  r i sk .  
I have s a i d  many t i m e s ,  and I r e m i  again,  t h a t  on 
ed f l i g h t  there are r i sks  n ' t  for some nu- 
ars be able to  e rocket, the  best  
r l d ,  without ha lved. I guess, 
~ a ~ t e ~ ~  you can' t  r e a l l y  d your car and go 
anymore without tak ing  e But there is r i s k  
in each  ne of o u r  f l i g h t s .  
So w e  have therefore d on rassessing t h e  
d e m e n t s  of i n c r e  ed r i s k  to x t  s tep  toward 
o u r  design mission. 
I po in t  o u t  h4re t h a t  o u r  spacecraft w a s  designed 
for t h i s  mission. W e  provided redundancy to recognize t h e  
f a i l i n g s  of both people and equipment, and w e  have had very 
good experience i n  o u r  ground and f l i g h t  test programs. Our 
spacecraft When i t  flies has  performed exceedingly w e l l .  
Our ground test experience i n  t e s t i n g  a l l  of these subsystems 
has demonstrated t h e  proper margin of design condition. 
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Now, w e  have got a large margin for  unknowns o r  
errors on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  6-prime mission. As B i l l  Schneider 
w i l l  show you, w e  have considerable  margins of consumables 
aboard, and ou r  s y s t e m s  have design margi which w e  w i l l  
i n  no way tax on t h i s  mission. Because w e  don't have a LM 
aboard, w e  have a very cons iderable  s e r v i c e  propuls ion 
s y s t e m  propel lan t  margin which can be used i n  t h e  event t ha t  
w e  have t h e  overnominal  condi t ion  t h a t  would r equ i r e  e x t r a  
propel lan t  for  example. 
W e  th ink  it is f o r t u i t o u s  for u s  t h a t  w e  are able 
t o  carry out  t h i s  f l i g h t  and take one s i g n i f i c a n t  b i t e  ou t  
of t h e  w h o l e  series of t h ings  w e  have t o  do to  g e t  u p  to 
a f u l l  l una r  landing capabi l i ty ,  but  a b i t e  t h a t  doesn?t  in- 
volve swallowing a t  a l l .  And that  b i t e  involves one complex 
spacecraft 0- namely, command and s e r v i c e  module w i t h  which 
w e  have considerable  experience now -- but without t h e  l una r  
module. We th ink  tha t  the  added r i sks  t h a t  are over and 
above those t h a t  w e  undertake for any manned f l i g h t  are equal  
t o  those genera l ly  inherent  in the progre s i v e  f l i g h t  test 
program as you go from one s t e p  t o  the  other, as w e  d i d  i n  
Gemini, as w e  are i n  Apollo, 
And w e  know t h a t  t h e  probabi l i ty  of success  for 
a luna r  landing is enhanced by g e t t i n g  th i a  element of crew 
and ope ra t iona l  experience and t h i  element of added demon- 
s t r a t i o n  and data ga ther ing  as regards, t h e  navigat ion and 
performance of ou r  whole s y s t e m .  
Next chart. 
F i n a l l y ,  w e  have done i n  designing 
t h e  Gpr ime luna r  o rb i t  mission 
mission t o  meet the  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  w e  have established. 
We w i l l  launch i n  dayl ight .  We vi11 mai i n  a l l  t h e  way 
t o  luna r  orbit  i n s e r t i o n  a f r ee - r e tu rn  t ectory. Now, what 
t h i s  means is t h a t  from t h e  moment of tr l u n a r  i n j e c t  ion  
onward u n t i l  w e  reach t h e  po in t  of i n s e r t i n g  the  spacecraft 
i n t o  lunar  orbit  t h a t  i f  no fur ther  maneuvers are performed 
wi th  t h e  main spacecraft engine w e  can maintain the course 
which w i l l  f l y  past t h e  moon and come back to  t h e  earth 
w i t h  small midcourse corrections which are wi th in  t h e  capa- 
b i l i t y  of t h e  small thrusters, t h e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m ,  f ree- re turn  
trajectory. And t h a t  tsmphwizes tha t .  
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Translunar midcourse co r rec t ion  can be accomplished 
wi th  t h e  small thrus te rs  and w i l l  keep us  on a coume t h a t  
br ings u s  back to  an acceptable earth landing, 
This mission is designed w i t h  a two-burn en t ry  
i n t o  luna r  o rb i t ,  The f i r s t  burn pu t s  us on a 60 x 1 7 0 - m i l e  
orbit  around the  moon, and the  second burn then c i r c u l a r i z e s  
a t  60 m i l e s ,  Those are nau t i ca l  m i l e s ,  
We have minimized the  t i m e  i n  l una r  orbit ,  t en  revo- 
lu t ions ,  approximately 20 hours. W e  have minimized t h e  r e t u r n  
t i m e .  Our nominal mission discussed over  t h e  y e a r s  has con- 
templated about 72 hours, about three days,  r e t u r n  t o  earth 
from t h e  moon. We have s u f f i c i e n t  propel lan t  margins on t h i s  
f l i g h t  because w e  don't have a LM aboard and s u f f i c i e n t  re- 
se rve  demonstrated i n  t h e  heat s h i e l d  to  come back a l i t t l e  
b i t  faster, so w e  have b u i l t  t h i s  trajectory to  68 hours r e t u r n  
t i m e ,  That minimizes t he  t i m e  back to  earth from the  moon. 
There is a midcourse co r rec t ion  provided i n  the  t rans-  
earth leg to  maintain e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  reent ry  corridor. And 
w e  have provided for a short-range, non-skip reent ry  which 
provides us  about three l e v e l s  of backup for being able to 
make t h a t  reen t ry  r e tu rn ,  B i l l  Schneider w i l l  describe t h a t ,  
Nay, w e  can put  the l i g h t s  on now. What I have 
t r i e d  t o  do is to  remind you of and summarise for you t h e  
background of t he  last year that  has  l e d  us up t o  a state of 
readiness  f o r  a f l i g h t  to lunar  orbit  and r e t u r n  w i t h  Apollo 8 
and describe for  you some of the  more s i g n i f i c a n t  technical 
factors t h a t , w e  have examined, many of them i n  great depth, 
i n  t h e  la$t severaS. months o r  the last few weeks and s e v e r a l  
days  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
With t h a t  I would l ike to  t u r n  it over  to B i l l  
Schneider who w i l l  describe for you the Ago110 8 lunar  orbit  
mission. B i l l  Schneider is t h e  mission director for  t h i s  
mission. 
B i l l  , 
SCHNIIEIDER: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 
I would 1Ue to take, t h e  next few minutes to  describe for 
you what we're going t o  be doing on Apollo 8 mission, I 
w i l l  be stepping through 8 l i t t l e  b i t  fas t  because it is a 
26 
long mission. Of course,  as far  as w e  are concerned, t h e  
mission has just about begun. 
If I may have t h e  first s l i d e ,  please, j u s t  to 
br ing  you up to date and t o  poin t  o u t  to  you what ou r  a c t i v i -  
ties are going to  be i n  t h e  upcoming days ,  I prepared t h i s  
s l i d e  here to  show what t h e  coming events  are, W e  w i l l  
s tar t  off on t h i s  Fr iday,  t h e  15th -- a s l i g h t  error i n  t h e  
s l i d e  here 0- w i t h  ou r  f l i g h t  readiness  test. T h i s  is our 
last big electrical test of t h e  spacecraft and launch 
veh ic l e  t o  a s su re  t h a t  it is ready for  f l i g h t .  
This  is a crew p a r t i c i p a t i n g  test, and t h e  crew 
sits i n  the  capsule  i n  their s h i r t s l e e v e s ,  
W e  then have a reasonably le isurely pace on through 
our  normal (checkout procedure u n t i l  w e  come to  o u r  countdown 
demonstration test, The countdown demonstration test is going 
t o  be run i n  t he  same sequence t h a t  w e  r an  the  Apollo 7 .  
That is, w 0  w i l l  f i r s t  have a w e t  countdown demonstration 
test -- t ha t  i s ,  a complete s imula t ion  from beginning to end 
of the  countdown without t h e  crew. We w i l l  use a l l  t h e  pro- 
p e l l a n t s  on board and a l l  of t h e  procedures w i l l  be just as 
if t h e  crew were there. However, t h e  capsule  w i l l  be unmanned. 
We w i l l  then recycle, and the  next day  we w i l l  d r y  
a t  which t i m e  t h e  crew w i l l  be i n  t h e  f i n a l  test, W e  
go throygh t b  f i n 4 1  day\without  t h e  p rope l l an t s  on 
This  is 8 reasonably l e i s u r e l y  schedule, We have 
ample t i m e  i n  here to  accomplish a l l  of these. 
We do repergve t h e  r i g h t  for ourse lves  to s h u f f l e  
dates around a l i t t l e  b i t  here and there, although I don't 
a n t i c i p a t e  t ha t  there w i l l  be anything major come up between 
now and then. 
However, on t h e  7 th ,  i f  w e  f i n i s h  on tha t  date, 
w e  then have a recycle t i m e  -- may I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  
please -0 for o u r  countdown. 
Now, w e  have a long countdown, which begins on 
the 16th  of December. You w i l l  n o t i c e  w e  have about n ine  
days  i n  cas0 w e  come up w i t h  any problems i n  the  countdown 
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demonstration test before w e  pick up our  count. And it is 
a long Apollo count,  101-hour count,  which w i l l  be picked 
up about 9;45 p.m. on t h e  16th  of December, and w e  w i l l  go 
through a l l  of t h e  checks t h a t  w e  normally go through lead- 
ing  up t o  our f i n a l  count. 
May I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  please. 
This begins about 10:45 on t h e  night  of t h e  19th. 
This  i s n ' t  an empty space i n  here, bel ieve me.  I t  j u s t  80 
happens that  these are the  only bars t h a t  have been picked 
out  * 
We do e n t e r  our  no a l  bu i l t - i n  hold, a six-hour 
hold, a t  4:45 p.m. on t h e  20 I picking up again t h e  count 
a t  minus nine hours at about :45 p.m. that evening, aiming 
for  a launch on the 21st a t  
We have not completely determined the precise moment 
of l i f t o f f  as y e t .  I t  w l l l  be a t 7:45 i n  the  morning, 
g ive  or take a few minutes. 
May I have the next slli 
criteria for launch window@, f i r s t  w e  
have es tab l i sh  n e r a l  criteria. P r i m a r i l y ,  w e  desire 
a d a y l i g h t  l a u  That is, we would 
launch, We have set 
ave a f ree- re turn  trajectory, 
igh t ing  i n  the Apollo 
zones. 
We are imuth 0- t h a t  is, 
d i r ec t ions  from t can launch by range 
safety and by per 108 degrees. And w e  
w i l l  i n  a l l  probabi l i ty  u t i l i z e  t h i s  f u l l  range. 
And w e  have set up our  launch windowa rjruch tha t  
w e  have t w o  oppor tun i t i  for any launch time for a trans- 
lunar  i n j ec t ion ,  t he  first opportuni ty  being a t  t h e  second 
rev and t h e  second opportuni ty  being one r ev  later. 
Looking a t  t h e  p r i m a r y  windows that w e  are aiming 
for ,  w e  are picking up, as I stated, the  launch window on 
the  21st a t  about 7:45, and w e  do have approximately a 
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five-hour launch window, These are a l l  Eastern Standard 
Times, I might add. We have about a five-hour launch window 
t h a t  w e  w l l l  be aiming for tha t  day. 
On successive days  t he  launch window moves down 
through the  time period as you can see here, w i t h  on the  26th 
here picking up a t  it looks l i k e  about fou r  o'clock, 
We do desire, as I said,  a dayl ight  launch, both 
If we do go on picking up the  count and ending t h e  count, 
the  2 l s t ,  w e  w i l l  be going for the  Apollo zone, the eastern-  
most Apollo zone, We w i l l  have a sun e l eva t ion  angle  a t  t h e  
seventh lunar  revolut ion of about 6.7 degrees, which is j u s t  
about what w e  desire, 
May I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  please, 
Looking a t  the  launch phase, I might state again 
t h e  launch of the  Saturn V comes off from the pad 39A. 
Nothing unusual i n  our  launch phase. I t ' s  a t y p i c a l  Saturn V 
launch phase, and w e  do have our  normal abort capabilities 
tha t  you're a l l  f u l l y  aware of i n  case of malfunctions i n  
t h e  launch vehic le  on the  way up, 
We do have a l t e r n a t e  missions e s t a b l b h e d  i n  cases 
where we have e a r l y  terminat ion of t h r u s t  on one of t h e  stages, 
and i n  general  they  lead to  an u l t imate  earth orbital  mission, 
although i f  w e  got an, e a r l y  cutoff  of the  S-IVB j u s t  prior 
to i n s e r t i o n  w e  would probably hgve enough SPS capabi l i ty  t o  
go on w i t h  t he  mission, I'm s o r r y ,  I mean 5-11 stage. The 
S - I n ,  of course,  is needed for the t r ans luna r  in jec t ion .  
So i n  general  i f  w e  have an e a r l y  cu tof f  and m u s t  
use t h e  SPS engine in going iqto a lunar  o rb i t  i n se r t ion ,  
our  first a l t e r n a t e  miss$on then is a repeat of the C mission, 
approximately t e n  days  i n  earth orbit ,  
Next s l i d e ,  please. 
Just b r i e f ly  summarizing w h a t  t h e  mission looks 
l i ke ,  just to  o r i e n t  you before I go through the  phases, 
t h i s  is an artist's representa t ion  of what t h e  mission looks 
l i ke ,  I t  begins, of course,  at  the  Cape w i t h  i n s e r t i o n ,  
and then w e  go i n t o  our  one orbit  for systems.checkout,  
and f i n a l l y  our  second orb i t  for our  lunar  orbit  i m e r t i o n  -- 
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I ' m  sorry -- for our  t r ans luna r  i n se r t ion .  We do our  
TLI burp -0 t h a t  is, t h e  second i g n i t i o n  of t h e  5-IvB -- 
at t h i s  po in t  ( ind ica t ing)  and go on o u t  on our  coast, 
midcourse corrections -- 1'11 go i n t o  a l l  of these i n  a 
l i t t l e  more detail  -- and then f i n a l l y  our  lunar  orbit  in- 
s e r t i o n  on the  back s i d e  of t h e  moon. 
A s  Sam s a i d ,  a two-phase lunar  orbit  i n s e r t i o n ,  t h e  
first being pu t t ing  us i n  a 60 x 170, and then f i n a l l y  a 
c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  a t  60, Ten orbits then i n  lunar  orbit .  
Followed then by a tramearth i n s e r t i o n ,  come back, and then 
f i n a l l y  sp lash  down i n  t h e  Pacific. 
A t  each one of these po in t s  w e  do have specific 
goho  go po in t s  and specific go/no go decisions, and w i t h i n  
which w e  have preplanned a l t e r n a t e s  t h a t  I w i l l  be descr ibing 
t h a t  w e  w i l l  u t i l i z e  i f  necessary at  these various poin ts .  
May I have the  next s l i d e ,  please. 
Turning to  t h e  f i r s t  phase, which is, of course,  t h e  
l i f t o f f ,  s y s t e m s  checkout, and f i n a l l y  terminat ing i n  t h e  
second S-IVB urn, that  puts  u s  i n  our  coast phase on out  
t o  t h e  moon. 
W e  have an earth trajectqry tha t  looks l i k e  t h i s  
( ind ica t ing) ,  Now9 our  g o h o  go poin t  is stet up over  Australia 
for t h e  large burn, and w e  w i l l  g ive  t h e  "go" providing w e  have 
surance t h a t  t he  S-IVB w i l l  satisfactorily complete its 
nd burn -- that  is, providing w e  know of no f a i l u r e  i n  
t h e  S I V B ,  p ~ o v ~ d i ~ g  t h a t  t h e  consurmables i n  t h e  S-IVB are 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  not only start t h e  burn but also t o  f i n i s h  
t h e  burn, and t h a t  w e  have no known reason t h a t  the S-IVB 
would shu t  down. 
Also on the  spacec ra f t  s ide ,  t h e  "go1' decis ion  w i l l  
be given only i f  t h e  spacecraft is completely operable wi th  
a l l  redundancies, 
If w e  have an e a r l y  cu tof f  of t h e  S-IVB at  t h i s  
point  i n  t i m e ,  w e  have some preplanned a l t e r n a t e  missions t h a t  
basical ly  take advantage of what are on t h e  impulse w e  have 
imparted t o  t h e  spacecraft. 
lead to a 4,000-mile apogee before w e  ge t  premature cu tof f  
of t h e  S-IVB, w e  w i l l  cont inue on ou t  and do a high earth 
If w e  are on an o rb i t  t h a t  w i l l  
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orbital  mission, then deorbit  -- that  is, up to  4,000 miles, 
s t a y  there for  two revs,  then deorbit and s t a y  up t e n  d a y s  
i n  earth orb i t ,  repeat ing those por t ions  of t h e  C mission 
t h a t  w e  feel w e  need to. 
There are a series of other a l t e r n a t e s  i f  w e  get  on out .  
Su f f i ce  it Yo s a y  i f  t he  5-IVB c u t s  off prematurely 
and our  apogee is over 60,000 m i l e s ,  we w i l l  assess the s i tua -  
t i o n  and i n  a l l  probabi l i ty  go on a c i r c w l u n a r  f l i g h t  using 
t h e  SPS engine to provide the  add i t iona l  impulse t h a t  would be 
necessary.  
If w e  f a i l  t o  i n j e c t  a t  t h i s  po in t ,  w e  w i l l  i n j e c t  
one rev later over a t  t h i s  po in t  here ( ind ica t ing ) ,  
Next s l i de .  
QUESTION: What poin t?  
IDER: One r ev  later. 
QUESTION: Over what point  d i d  you s a y ?  
: It  would be roughly r i g h t  around here,  
B i l l ,  one rev later ( indicat ing) .  
May I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  please. 
Now, when w e  m a k e  t h a t  t r ans luna r  i n j e c t i o n  burn 
w i t h  t he  S-IVB, w e  are as Sam has s a i d ,  on our  way home. 
That is, w e  w i l l  be i n s e r t i n g  i n t o  a f r e e r e t u r n  trajectory. 
We have set up our  f l i g h t  dynamics such tha t  a t  a l l  t i m e s  w i t h  
our  s e r v i c e  module RCS s y s t e m  w e  can put  whatever impulse might 
be necessary to  correct any deViatiQIW.3 for  a free r e t u r n  tra- 
jectory t h a t  would ge t  u s  back down t o  the earth without any 
need for t h e  SPS engine.’  
Theore t ica l ly ,  of course,  w e  are a t  the end of 
t h e  first burn -- end of t he  5-IVB burn -- theoretically we 
are on a f r ee - r e tu rn  trajectory without any co r rec t ion  what- 
soever.  
During t h i s  t rans lunar  coast period, as w e  go on 
out  to  the  moon, w e  do have t h e  po in t s  a t  which w e  p lan  t o  
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assess the  s i t u a t i o n ,  and w e  would abort -- t ha t  is, w e  would 
come back either circumlunar or high apogee i f  w e  lost re- 
dundancy i n  some of our  on-board spacecraft s y s t e m s ,  
Specifically,  if w e  lose redundancy i n  t h e  environ- 
mental con t ro l  s y s t e m ,  the s e r v i c e  module and propuls ion 
s y s t e m  or t h e  electrical power s y s t e m ,  w e  would elect to 
abort the mission. A l s o ,  i f  w e  lost selected portions of 
t h e  guidance and con t ro l  s y s t e m ,  communication s y s t e m  or the  
sequen t i a l  s y s t e m ,  
May I have t h e  next  s l i d e ,  please. 
Looking a t  how long it would take uet to  come home, 
t h i s  s l i d e  here s h  s t h e  minimum t i m e  Prom abort to landing 
as a funct ion of t i m e ,  of elapsed t i m e ,  of making the dec is ion  
to abort, For example, if we decided a t  40 hours ou t  t ha t  w e  
wished t o  abort the mission, w e  would be back i n  something on 
t h e  order of 20 hours. S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  w e  go on ou t  to  t h e  
moon, t h i s  point  here, we'd and up doing a circumlunar mission 
and not a high a l t i t u d e  abort. 
We have, a ~ t h o u g h  w e  don't have to uBe it to abort-- 
f lable for abort during t h a t  period of t i m e  10,000 
ropuls ion s y s t e m ,  and, as I 
rt on our  normal f ree-return 
r orbit  i n s e r t i o n ,  after the  lunar  o rb i t  
to come home ra Nominally, as General 
72-hour r e tu rn ,  For 
h l y  a 55-hour r e tu rn ,  If we decided that  
o get home fast and wanted to use t h i s  4,000 foot 
running along t h i s  l i n e  here ( indicat ing) .  
have ava i l ab le ,  w e  could have r e t u r n  times 
May I have the  next s l i d e ,  please. 
One po in t  that  I d i d  not  m a k e  is roughly i n  t h i s  
tiane period here, approximately f i v e  hours i n t o  the  mission, 
w e  w i l l  do a propel lan t  dump on t h e  S-IVB, which i n  essence 
pu t s  us in -- t h a t  is, a r8trOgrade dump which g ives  us  
about 90 foot per second, which basical ly  pu t s  t he  S-IVB 
behind the  spacecraft -- and because of f l i g h t  dynamics and 
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orbi ta l  mechanics 0- and w e  end up w i t h  a s l i n g s h o t  mode 
w i t h  the S-IVB on a nominal trajectory going on out i n t o  
solar orbi t  0 
A t  t h i s  po in t  I would l i k e  to ta lk  about communica- 
t i o n s  and p o i n t  ou t  to you t h a t  w e  do have preplanned i n  our 
mission t h e  a b i l i t y  to provide t e l e v i s i o n  back t o  earth. W e  
are providing for  two methods of t e l e v i s i o n  coverage i n  our 
f l i g h t  plan,  one a t  about 31 hours and one about 55 hours i n t o  
t h e  f l i g h t .  
Now, t h e  TV does r e q u i r e  the  use  of the  high-gain 
antenna. And, as General P h i l l i p s  said, t h i s  is t he  f i r s t  
f l i g h t  for the high-gain antenna, and so there is a f i n i t e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  w e  might no t  be able t o  get t he  TV for you. 
However, as General P h i l l i p s  d id  state, the  use  of t h e  omni 
antennas provides a l l  of t h e  communications t ha t  w e  need oper- 
a t i o n a l l y .  The loss of t h e  high-gain antenna would cause us 
t o  lose Ty i n  t h e  o u t e r  f r i n g e s  as w e l l  as biomedical data 
and high b i t  rate data. 
We r e t a i n  a l l  t e l e m e t r y  data t h a t  g ives  us t h e  w e l l -  
being of t h e  s y s t e m .  We r e t a i n  a l l  voice communications and 
a l l  track, but what we  do lose, 88 I said, i f  w e  lose the  
s y s t e m ,  is TV, biomedical, and high b i t  rate. 
We do have t h e  dec is ion  pointsr for midcourse correc- 
t i o n s .  These come at  about s i x  hours, 24 hours after TLI., 
and about 20 hours a t  e igh t  hours before l u n a r  orbit  i n se r t ion .  
We have fou r  dec is ion  p o i n t s  where w e  w i l l  decide whether or 
not  w e  are going to m a k e  t h e  burn. 
We w i l l  m a k e  a l l  burns tha t  w e  poss ib ly  can us ing  
t h e  s e r v i c e  module RCS sys t em.  
Xf t he  ground computation tells u s  t h a t  a delta-V 
of less than one foot per second is required, w e  w i l l  m a k e  
no attempt to  make the  burn. That is, w e  w i l l  no t  correct 
t h a t .  If t h e  ground tells  u s  t h a t  c o r r e c t i o n  is more on 
t h e  order of fou r  feet per second, w e  w i l l  use t h e  SPS 
s y s t e m  t o  make t h e  burn. 
May I have the  next s l i d e ,  please. 
e. 
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How accura te ly  do w e  know Where we are going? 
Th i s  s l i d e  here shows our  p red ic t ion  on p e r i l i n e  or 3 sigma K -- t h a t  is a high probabi l i ty  case -0 as w e  go on out  i n t o  
t h e  mission. 
Here w e  have t i m e  from a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  moon as a 
funct ion 0% uncer ta in ty  i n  where you t h i n k  you are going to  
be. You can see t h a t  70 hours -- t ha t  is, a t  t h e  beginning 
of t h e  mission -0 our  3 sigma Uncertainty is about 13 m i l e s ,  
12 o r  13 m i l e s ,  and it rapfd ly  decreases down to  about f i v e  
m i l e s ,  and then when w e  get  close to  the  moon w e  ge t  down 
t o  t h e  order of one m i l e .  
The spacecraft, t h i s  on-board s y s t e m ,  roughly h 
an uncertainty of about s i x  m i l e s ,  so w e  know p r e t t y  w e l l  
where w e  are going. 
Next s l i d e ,  please. 
The lunar  o rb i t  i n s e r t i o n  burn, as w e  stated, i a s  a 
two-burn and is a burn for 60 x 170 followed by 60 x 60 burn, 
both of which are on t h e  back s i d e  of the moon. 
Our fixed a t t i t u d e  burns-- And w e  again have specific 
g o h o  go criteria for conducting these burns. In  essence, w e  
w i l l  not conduct t h e  burns if w e  have had t h e  loss of some 
selected s y s t e m s .  And there is a complete list of t hose  sys -  
tems t h e  loss o f  which would r equ i r e  t h a t  we not go i n t o  lunar  
orbit  but do come back on a circumlunar f l i g h t .  
A t y p i c a l  example of t h i s  is i f  w e  lost one en t ry  
ba t te ry  w e  would elect not to go i n  an W I  burn. 
Next s l i d e ,  please. 
When w e  get i n t o  lunar  orbi t ,  t h i s  is t h e  t i m e  l ine--  
I 'd  better take a moment t o  explain what these are. This 
chart over  here begins w i t h  rev  1 and goes through to  rev 10 
w i t h  a d a y b i g h t  cycle as you go on through, w i th  t h e  a c t i v i -  
ties ticked off on bars down here. 
Th i s  chart over  here s ta r t s  w i t h  t h e  W I  first burn 
a t  t h i s  p o i n t  here. The earth is down i n  t h i s  d i rec t ion .  The 
sun is up i n  t h i s  d i rec t ion .  And then  t h e  orbit  t i m e  l i n e  
is depicted i n  t h e  spiral. 
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You recognize, of course,  t h a t  w e  s t a y  i n  t h e  
60-mile orb i t  throughout , 
In  general ,  the  first pass, t h e  first a c t i v e  pass 
here, is taken up w i t h  s e q u e n t i a l  photographs -- tha t  is, 
photographs wherein w e  wish t o  determine what t h e  moon looks 
l i ke ,  what ou r  landing sites look l i ke ,  
W e  then go i n t o  a series of stereo photographs and 
go on i n t o  the  mission w i t h  some landmark t racking.  
We do have a t  t h i s  point- Th i s  is t h e  easternmost 
Apollo landing site. We do have fou r  separate attempts or 
four  separate t i m e s  a t  which w e  w i l l  track t h e  Apollo landing 
s i te .  We have scheduled also three a d d i t i o n a l  sites on t he  
back s i d e  of t h e  moon t h a t  w e  wish to track i n  order to  see 
what ou r  a b i l i t y  is to  track, both t o  track on board as w e l l  
as todetermine from the ground how good our  t racking  accuracy 
is . 
We have a number of requests from s c i e n t i s t s  t o  con- 
duct some s c i e n t i f i c  i nves t iga t ions  p r i m a r i l y  looking a t  t h e  
solar corona, looking at d i m  s k y .  Most of these a c t i v i t i e s  
take place i n  these dark periods back here. 
In  genera l ,  t h e  crewmen w i l l  be s l eep ing  -- or  rest- 
ing  I guess I should s a y  -- i n  two-hour cycles throughout t h i s  
period, leading us then t o  transearth i n j e c t i o n  a t  t h e  appro- 
pr ia te  t i m e ,  
I might s a y  r i g h t  here t h a t  w e  are ca r ry ing  a number 
0f photographic equipments on board. 
cameras wi th  a number of rolls of black-and-white and color 
f i l m ,  as w e 1 1  aa a 16 m i l l i m e t e r  ( aure r )  camera, 
We have two Hasselblat 
We are planning hopefully -- and 1 can ' t  te l l  you pre- 
c i s e l y  when r i g h t  now 0- i f  t h e  high-gain antenna is up -- 
t o  have some periods of W .  
be i n  t h i s  genera l  area here i n  order t o  get the l i n e  of s i g h t  
back t o  the  earth. We are looking a t  revs  1, 2 and 9, although 
I can ' t  specify for you which revolu t ion  of those  w e  w i l l  
select y e t ,  
And, of course,  it w i l l  have to  
The l u n a r  orbit  phase would be aborted for  c e r t a i n  
specific losses of equipment, p r i m a r i l y  for loss of redundancy 
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i n  t h e  guidance and c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  o r  i n  t h e  electrical 
buses o r  i n  any of t h e  r e d u n ~ a n c i e s  on SPS s e r v i c e  module 
propulsion s y s t e m .  
Next s l i d e ,  please. 
Transearth i n j e c t i o n ,  w e  said, is nominally a t  
t h e  end of t h e  t e n t h  revolut ion.  We do have t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
to  maintain ourselves  i n  l u n a r  orbit  for  one or t w o  more orbits 
if there is some overpowering reason for  doing so. However, 
t h e  nominal p lan  t h a t  w e  w i l l  attempt to  maintain is to  come 
back a t  the  end of t e n  revolut ions.  
We have targeted our  landing longi tude a t  165 degrees 
w e s t  0- that is, almost i r e c t l y  sou th  of H a w a i i .  And a l l  of 
ou r  landing zone for  a l l  of our  l i f t o f f  times and a l l  of o u r  
l i f to f f  days  are on that  l i n e .  We do not  c o n t r o l  our  la t i -  
tude u n t i l  t r a n s e a r t h  in j ec t ion .  A t  t h a t  po in t  w e  decide what 
l a t i t u d e  w e  w i l l  be going to. 
We are t a r g e t i n g  for t h e  middle of t h e  corridor, and 
w e  are t a r g e t i n g  for  maintaining our  capabi l i ty  w i t h  a r een t ry  
speed. 
i d e  j u s t  sh ed w e  d i d  come back i n  
over  Asia. 
Next 9 e. 
d,  aga in  have t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
11 be conducting midcourse COP 
rections. These ag obably be conducted using t h e  
s e r v i c e  module reae 1 s y s t e m ,  and w e  w i l l  direct 
the  trajectory for Corr n t r o l  only,  and w e  w i l l  maintain 
Thoes corr w i l l  be made a t  t h e  morat convenient 
t i m e s ,  and they  s u b j e c t  to t h e  same delta-V restrictions 
I spoke about before. 
May I have the  next  s l i d e ,  please.  
Just to  g ive  you an idea of what kind of uncer ta in ty  
w e  have i n  reent ry  f l i g h t  path angle ,  t h i s  chart w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  
set up for  one of t h e  longer r e t u r n  t i m e s ,  and for o u r  [iO-odd- 
hour r e t u r n  t i m e  you j u  t squeeze it up a l i t t l e  b i t .  
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You can see the  manned space f l i g h t  network itself 
without any assistance on board w i l l  g i v e  us a l i t t l e  over  
a degree of uncer ta in ty  at  TEI, and t h i s  very r ap id ly  con- 
verges down to  the  one degree which w e  feel is most desirable, 
very quickly comes down to  a very, very nominal l e v e l ,  m o s t  
satisfactory for  reent ry ,  
"he spacecraft i tself ,  w e  believe t h a t  is a reent ry  
guidance uncer ta in ty ,  3 sigma, of about t h a t  order of magni- 
tude ( ind ica t ing)  -- w e l l ,  wi th in  what is necessary. What 
is necessary is something on t h e  order of a degree, 
May I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  please. 
Entry itself looks something l i k e  t h i s ,  T h i s  is a 
s l i g h t  v a r i a t i o n  from t h e  skip r een t ry  t h a t  you may have 
been familiar w i t h ,  i n  t h a t  w e  are f l y i n g  what w e  are c a l l i n g  
a constant  g reentry.  We have decided to  use  only 1,350 m i l e s  
of our  nominal reent ry  range, although t h i s  range is a v a i l a b l e  
t o  u s  by our l i f t i n g  reentry.  We d i d  select t h i s  short range 
i n  order to ge t  t h i s  t h i r d  backup I might s a y  -- mode of 
cons tan t  g, 
QUESTION: Is that  what w e  called "footprint" i n  
earlier f l i g h t s ?  
: Yese And I w i l l  go i n t o  t h a t  a l i t t l e  
b i t  fu r the r .  
or weather avoidance, if w e  aremore than one day o u t  
e r v i c e  propulsion s y s t e m  t o  a d j u s t  ou r  nominal 
e are less than  one day o u t ,  w e  w i l l  
retarget our  en t ry  poin t  and use o u r  f o o t p r i n t  for weather 
avoidance. 
This is what t h e  trajectory w i l l  look like, Entry 
And w e  do e n t e r  S-band, w e  e n t e r  i n t e r f a c e  a t  400,000 feet, 
t h e  blackout region, and begin f l y i n g  ou r  cons tan t  g reent ry ,  
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  sk ip  r een t ry ,  which would nomin- 
a l l y  have taken u s  much f u r t h e r  o u t  i n  t h e  atmosphere and 
then come back i n ,  w e  p u l l  t h i s  constant  4 g's, and do a 
l i t t l e  d ip ,  come ou t  of blackout, and then come on back in .  
This whole a c t i v i t y  here takes about 14 or 15 minutes. 
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QUESTION: How many g's, B i l l ?  
SCHNEIDEFt: About 4 gts scheduled. 
One th ing  I should mention a t  t h i s  po in t  is w e  are 
going t o  g ive  the crew "go" for tak ing  off t h e i r  s u i t  a t  
i n j e c t i o n  i n t o  orbi t ,  back on one of t h e  earlier slides, and 
they  w i l l  conduct t h e  mission, t h e  remainder of t h e  mission, 
without s u i t s .  That is, reent ry  w i l l  be without space s u i t s .  
We have provided t h e  crew w i t h  heel r e s t r a i n t s  and 
also w i t h  a head r e s t r a i n t ,  which, if you recall, were t h e  
two areas of concern on Apollo 7 .  
QUESTION: Does tha t  include r een t ry  then, B i l l ?  
SCIINBIDER: Y e s  sir. 
Next s l i d e ,  plea80. 
Footprint .  This is o u r  r een t ry  coverage. We do 
We have s t a t i o n e d  a Mercury sh ip  a t  t h i s  po in t ,  
cone i n ,  as I stated, over  Asia. We have very good t racking  
of Guam. 
and then w e  come down and touch down here. We have t h e  York- 
town i n  the  recovery area. 
A s  I said, recovery is along 165 longi tude and for  
a nominal mission w i l l  be approximately a t  t h i s  po in t  (indi- 
cat ing 1. 
Next S l i d e ,  please+ 
I would l i ke  t o  summarise for you t h e  mission by 
t ine  BO t h a t  you w i l l  get an idea of when th ings  occur. And 
t h i s  s l i d e  over  here shows t h e  nominal mission times t h a t  
t h ings  w i l l  occur,  plus delta times, for d i f f e r e n t  l i f t o f f  
days.  That is, nominally, for example, a nominal t o t a l  mission 
is s i x  days  and four hours approximately. W e  could conceivably 
be as long as one day longer  or fou r  hours shorter i f  w e  l if ted 
off a t  a d i f f e r e n t  l i f t o f f  t i m e .  
I guess t h e  big numbers t o  po in t  ou t  are t h e  TLI 
burn, which is roughly about 311 seconds and s t a y s  p r e t t y  
close to  t h a t  no matter what our  t i m e  is, and t h e  f ree- re turn  
circumlunar tine, which is another  key  number, is about 130 hours 
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and 37 minutes. I t  can increase  some 17 hours or be as 
l i t t l e  as one hour shorter. 
The fx)I burn is almost independent of l i f t o f f  t i m e .  
There are some di f fe rences  because you do a plane co r rec t ion  
a t  t h a t  same t i m e ,  and the  plane change does change w i t h  l i f t -  
off day. 
I guess the  t r ansea r th  r e t u r n  t i m e  of 58 hours p lus  
nine minus two is t h e  other important point ,  
Again turning to  to ta l  delta-V, as far as t h e  launch 
vehicle  is concerned, w e  have plenty of delta-V ava i l ab le ,  
We use approximately 10,000 feet per second ou t  of t h e  
S-IVB for  t h i s  second, the  TLI burn. We have approximately, 
if I remember correctly, about f i v e  seconds of burn l e f t ,  
very comfortable margin. 
In t he  spacecraft, as I s a y ,  w e  expect to  do most 
of our  midcourse burns using t h e  SPS s y s t e m .  W e  have plenty- 
I ' m  s o r r y .  Using the RCS s y s t e m .  We have p l e n t y  of SPS 
s y s t e m  ava i l ab le  i f  w e  need it i n  there. W e  use  approximately 
7,000 feet per second. 
f l o a t i n g  around, and w e  haven't used tha t .  
We have about 4,000 feet per second 
J u s t  to show you where w e  s tand  i n  consumables, may 
I have the  next chart, please? 
RCS consumables. Those of you who have been follow 
ing  manned space f l i g h t  know t h a t  consumables have a lways  been 
something tha t  w e  have had to  play very c a r e f u l l y ,  and here 
w e  have a s i t u a t i o n  where I think a t  least i n  RCS f u e l  for 
nominal mission w e  have very l i t t l e  w o r r y  about the f u e l  
quan t i t i e s .  W e  have a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  much, w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
as shown up here, and you can see w e  probably use about 30 per  
c e n t  of it. 
May I have t h e  next  s l i d e ,  please, 
The SPS budget runs l i k e  t h i s .  Beside these, as I 
s a i d ,  we have about 4,000 foot per second left over. These 
are t h e  kinds of dispers ions  t h a t  w e  a n t i c i p a t e ,  3 sigma d i s -  
pers ions,  
3 sigma maximum dispers ion  for t h e  midcourse corrections. 
You can see w e  a n t i c i p a t e  about 120 feet per second 
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And the contingencies.  w e  have run l i k e  t h i s :  
500 feet per second i n  case w e  wanted t o  come home as soon 
as possible, And w e  have allotted these amounts of numbers, 
del ta-V's  ava i l ab le  for weather avoidance and th ings  of t h a t  
nature  . 
Out of the  4,000 w e  again appear to have no problem 
there. 
Looking a t  t h e  other consumables, electrical power, 
food and a l l  the rest of it seem i n  very good shape. 
Next s l i d e ,  please. 
One poin t  I would l ike to m a k e  very ca re fu l ly  are 
t h e  goho go points  t h a t  w e  do have i n  t h i s  mission, and 
t h e y  are listed here, and you can see t h a t  w e  have a number 
of decis ion poin ts  t h a t  w i l l  be made, and deciaion po in t s  
either to do something or  not  t o  do something. And t h e y  begin, 
of course,  w i t h  our  normal go/no go on launch where the  F l igh t  
Director w i l l  be making t h e  usual  decis ions whether o r  not w e  
m u s t  abort t h e  mission o r  go i n t o  one of t h e  contingency modes. 
Then +e have our  "go" after inse r t ion ,  which is 
rcgo'' for the  first orbit ,  and then so on throughout t h e  
mission u n t i l  f i n a l l y ,  as I stated, over  Aus t r a l i a  we do g ive  
t h e  "go" for  t h e  TLI burn. 
We have some very quick dec is ion  poin ts  t ha t  w e  w i l l  
m a k e  -- namePy, one approximately t en  minutes after TLI, w i t h  
a review of tha t  decis ion about 90 minutes after TLI, for a 
quick assessment of any d ispers ions  t h a t  w e  may have had, t o  
see i f  there is' any reason for not going on out .  
W e  then have the  dec is ion  po in t s  88 stated here 
for midcourse cor rec t ion , '  The first midcourse co r rec t ion  de- 
c i s i o n  poin t  is p lus  s i x  hours f r o m  TLI.. And then on here ' 
a t  24 hours f r o m  TLI, And t w o  a t  LO1 minus 20 hours and WI  
minus fou r  hours. 
In  lunar  orbi t  itself w e  w i l l  m a k e  a conscious 
g o h o  go dec is ion  approximately one every hour, 
May I have t h e  next s l i d e ,  please. 
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touch on t h e  a l t e r n a t e  m i ~ r s ~ o ~  88 I went 
through. I would l i k e  t o  quickly run t h  
t ha t  w e  do have preplanned a l t e r n a t e  mirs  
we  have established a philosophy that s a y s  w e  can do these 
preplanned a l t e r n a t e s  wi th  a minimum of add i t iona l  work and 
also to  g e t  a m a x i m u m  of r e t u r n  to  the program. And these 
are the  guidel ine@ t h a t  l ed  uo3 up to  -0 i f  I might have t h e  
next s l i d e  0.. decis ion  t o  come up w i t h  these a l t e r n a t e  missions. 
If w e  have an e a r l y  s epa ra t ion  for the S-IVB during 
the  f i r s t  i n s e r t i o n  i n t o  orbit  burn, w e  w i l l  i n  general  r e v e r t  
to  an earth orbital  mission. 
If w e  have enough SPS f u e l  on board, w e  w i l l  t r y  to 
go for a 4,000 m i l e  elipse, 
dec is ion  depending upon what kind of d e l t a 4  w e  have had to 
use i n  order t o  get i n t o  orbit. 
And t h a t  w i l l  be a real-time 
If w e  have XUD S-IVB i n j e c t i o n  burn -- t h a t  iaa, the, 
&IVB first burn w a s  Batisfactory but for some reason or other 
w e  i nh ib i t  t he  second burn of t h e  S-IVB -- w e  w i l l  use  t he  
spacecraft SPS t o  put  u s  i n t o  a high-apogee orbit and remain 
i n  t h a t  orbi t  for two to fou r  revolu t ions  and then come baok 
down and bas ica l ly  do a m a x i m u m  ten-day dura t ion  mission -- 
t h a t  is, repeat those elements of the  C mission t h a t  w e  feel 
necesssry to  do at tha t  t i m e ,  
If w e  have an e a r l y  cu tof f  of t h e  8-IVB -- t h a t  is, 
t h e  S-IVB begim to  burn but for some reason or other w e  
are forced to c u t  it off or it c u t s  off itself 0- w e  have a 
number of mission a l t e r n a t i v e s  whioh basically Bay w e ' l l  taka 
advantage of whatever a l t i t u d e  w e  have. 
If w e  are i n  t h i s  range here up to 4,000 m i l e s ,  w e  
I 'm @or rye  
go i n t o  the high apogeer 
w e  w i l l  have to come back i n  as soon aa w e  can- 
Xf w e  are 22,000 to  60,000, w e  w i l l  have t o  come back i n  on 
a direct reentry.  
d i f f e r e n t  . 
If we are 4,000 to  22,000 m i l - ,  
We don't have enough SPS to do anything 
If w e  are over  60,000, w e  w i l l  have to come back 
i n  on a direct reentry.  
anything d i f f e ren t .  
We don't have enough SPS t o  do 
If w e  are over  60,000 m i l e s ,  w e  w i l l  do a circlua- 
luna r  f l y  by. 
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Again, a l l  of these a l t e r n a t e  plans w i l l  be 
real-time dec is ions ,  and t h e  dec is ion  88 to  which one w e  
w i l l  exe rc i se  o r  whether or not  w e  w i l l  exercise it w i l l  
be dependent upon t h e  circumstances a t  t h a t  moment. 
However, w e  do have these a l t e r n a t e s  ava i l ab le .  
May I have t h e  next slide, please. 
J u s t  a brief reminder as t o  who the  crew is. 
Frank BollDan, J i m  Lovell, and Anders. Backup crew: Armstrong, 
Aldrin and Fred bise.  
In  add i t ion  to those you w i l l  see the  normal cast 
of characters a t  the Cape and a t  Houston: 
Rocco (Petrone) is again t h e  Launch Director a t  
KSC where a l l  the a c t i v i t y  is for the  next month and a ha l f  
or so, and he is backed up by Paul Donnelly, Launch Operations 
Manager . 
C h r i s  Kraft, t h e  Director of Fl ight  Operations a t  
Houston, has nominated C l i f f  Charlesworth as t h e  p r i m a r y  
F l i g h t  Director on t h i s  f l i g h t .  H e  w i l l  be backed up by 
Glen (Lundy) and also by a new Flight Director, ( M i l t  Lindler) .  
The Department of Defense recovery forces and support  
forces are headed up by General (Vince Huston). The DOD 
manager fo r  manned space f l i g h t  w i l l  be backed up by Rear 
A d m i r a l  (Bacudas) who is t h e  Commander of Task Force 130, 
P r i m a r y  Recovery Force . 
Admiral (McManus) w i l l  head up Task Force 140 
i n  t h e  e a s t e r n  recovery forces, w i t h  General Jones, Davy 
Jones, heading up t h e  Eastern T e s t  Range. 
The recovery vesse l ,  as 1 sa id ,  is t he  YORKmWN. 
Thank YOU. 
QUESTION: On tha t  a l t e r n a t e  mission, t h e  circum- 
lunar ,  how far  ou t  conceivably could t h e y  go? They go beyond 
t h e  moon and how much farther beyond? 
SCHNEIDER: We'd be t a r g e t i n g  for 60 n a u t i c a l  m i l e s  
around t h e  moon. 
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farther than the  moon? 
o ing  to be s h i r t s l e e v e  
a l l  the  wag? 
e l i f t o f f  phase. We go 
t ,  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  
'*go*' for  i n e e r t i o n  w e  w i l l  g i v e  them 
t the  same t i m e ,  contingent 
e had on ApoX10 7 ,  
ALI : D r ,  Pa ins  la t o  leave  i n  a few moment, 
so if there are any ques t ions  you wish t o  direct t o  him, w e  
w i l l  take those first. 
Okay e e8 anyone have a ques t ion  for Dr.  Paine? 
B i l l  Hines, 
TXON: Y e s .  I)r. Paine, w e  have heard t h a t  t h i s  
was i n  t h e  thinking stage and i n  t h e  review stage for a long, 
long t i m e ,  and SO forth, but when d i d  you real ly  m a k e  up your 
mind tha t  t h i s  was "go"? 
PAXNB: Fina l  dec is ion  w a s  made y e s t e r d a y  af ternoon 
about four o'clock, Bill, 
QUESTION: What sort of 8 meeting d i d  you have j u s t  
prior to that?  
PAINE: This w a s  a c t u a l l y  the clfraax of a series 
of meetings, The meeting y e s t e r d a y  w a s  a rather large meeting 
involving t h e  e n t i r e  execut ive establishment at NASA, both 
manned and unmanned, and tha t  w a s  fallowed by a srnaller 
meeting i n  which w e  had t h e  top people i n  Manned Space Fl ight ,  
and George Mueller, Wernher Von Braun, t h e  Center  Directors, 
and s e v e r a l  of our  consul tan ts ,  Tomray Thompson, Eberhart  Reese, 
and t h e  dec is ion  w a s  made a t  t h e  conclusion of t h a t  meeting 
by Dr. Mueller and nyself and our  Associate Administrator,  
H o m e r  Newell e 
QUESTION: Hmms that  made? By t he  three of you 
What w a s  the  m ~ c h ~ ~ i s m  for  t h e  voting? 
f i n a l  decis ion? 
O r  by a consensus? 
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y a vote ,  although t h e  
ere unanimous to  go 
for  t h e  lunar  orbiter 
TION: D r ,  Pains,  has Pres ident  Johnson and 
President-Elect Nixon-- 
t h e y  consulted before t h e  decis ion? 
Have they  been t o l d  and/or were 
: Y e s ,  t h e y  were informed y e s t e r d a y  a t  noon 
af ter  the dec is ion  w a s  made, 
QUESTION: J u s t  for  the  record, was t h a t  vote  
unanimous ? 
ALIBRANDO: Any more questiona for D r .  Paine? 
QUESTION: Y e s .  In  view o f  Zond 6 and whatever else 
you may know about t h e  Russian program, how do you feel now 
about ou r  chances of  being around t h e  moon before t h e y  are? 
PAINE: I real ly  don't know whether t h e  Russians 
are going to  make a manned circumlunar attempt before December 
or  not. T h i s  d i d  not p l a y  any part a t  all i n  ou r  dec is ion  on 
t h i s  f l i g h t .  
QUESTION: Since the  earliest days  of t h i s  program 
there w a s  a l w a y s  a plan  to  carry t h e  luna r  excursion module 
on any mimion which would involve a commitment for luna r  
o rb i t  on the theory t h a t  you could use  t h e  engines of t h e  LM 
s y s t e m ,  i n  case of one o f  these s e r v i c e  propulsion module 
breakdowns, t o  d r i v e  the  spacecraft back home. 
Now you are goAng to commit the  a s t ronau t s  to l u n a r  
orbit  without 8 func t iona l  LM, Could you t e l l  us why you 
think t h a t  w e  should do t h i s  i n  December, when i f  w e  waited 
u n t i l  next s p r i n g  w e  would have a LM and w e  would not  be 
pu t t ing  these as t ronau t s  i n  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  where t h e y  have 
no redundancy for  t h e i r  s e r v i c e  propulsion engine? 
PAINE: I be l i eve  that  adequately covered i n  
ou r  presenta t ions ,  We feel t h a t  t h e  backup s tern redundancy 
and t h e  p la teau  manner i n  which e are undert  
mission, on a step-by-step basis,  g i v e  u s  a great deal of 
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assurance,  and t h ~ t ,  ct ,  I bel ieve t h a t  
w e  ac tua l ly  have more t f ly ing  the  LM ou t  
t o  t h e  moon on t h i s  m i  
t h a t  t h i s  gives  us  on 
a t  t h i s  t i m e  w e  are ready for t h e  mission and t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  
be wi th in  the normal h 
craft , 
i t h  a l l  t he  add i t iona l  power 
umables, so t h a t  w e  feel tha t  
ards of test pilotrs f l y i n g  experimental 
QUESTION FROM ~ O U S ~ ~ :  In  the event t ha t  you d i d  
have reason t bel ieve tha t  t h e  o v i e t  Union w 
f l y  a manned lunar  f l i g h t  i n  December about t h e  same t i m e  we 
are t ry ing  to  do so, or i n  the  event t ha t  they  d i d  start  one 
j u s t  pr ior  t o  the  t i m e  w e  p lan  t o  start one, would t h i s  have 
any impact on our  own f l i g h t ?  
PAINB: No. 
ALIBRANDO: We w i l l  proceed w i t h  ues t ions  f r o m  here. 
QUESTION: Dr,  Paine,  can t h i s  mission now be con- 
s i d e r e d  t o  take the  place of t h a  F Mission? 
ALIBRANDO: Dr.  Paine has lef t ,  
W e  are going t o  proceed w i t h  quest ions from Washington, 
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s ,  if you are ready, you 
are probably t h e  most prominent s y s t e m s  i n t e g r a t i o n  manager 
w e  have, and I am s u r e  t h a t  you p l a y  t he  odds a good b i t .  
What do you t h i n k  t h e  odds are of the  f u l l  lunar  orbit  mission 
t o  be completed successfu l ly?  
PHILLIPS: 1% not going to t r y  to c a l c u l a t e  a 
I feel t h a t  set of probabi l i ty  numbers or odds for you. 
we're ready for luna r  orbit  mission and that we have every 
reason t o  expect t h a t  w e  w i l l  be able to  carry out  t h e  f u l l  
miss ion  and t o  succeed w i t h  i t ,  If I wasn't convinced of 
t h a t ,  I wouldn't have recommended such a mission i n  t h e  first 
place. 
Q-TION: One other quest ion is how near  t o  f u l l  
space simulat ion do you achieve on earth w i t h  a l l  of t h i s  
SPS t e s t ing?  What is the closest you think you get i n  
earth t e s t i n g  on the  SPS t o  s imulate  t h e  space environment? 
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P f our  s y s t e m s  and 
w i t h  the  SPS i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  are able t o  s imula te  the  
environs on earth i t h  one important 8x68 t i o n ,  and that 's  
zero g f l i g h t  of any s i g n i f i c a n t  durat ion.  
A s  you know, w e  can s imulate  zero g f l i g h t  for  only 
a matter of s e v e r a l  seconds by 135 aircraft, and up t o  about 
30 seconds of ero g f l i g  been performed. Of course,  
w e  can ' t  test p ~ o p u ~  i n  t h a t  environment, 
Except for t h e  zero g environment, w e  are able 
t o  s imulate  a l l  of t h e  important environments I th ink  rather 
w e l l .  
QUBSTION: Would you plerise share your opinion on 
Zone 6 w i t h  us? And could it be t t i t  is j u s t  a repet i t ion 
of No. S? 
PHILLIPS: I donwt  be l ieve  I know any more about 
Zond 6 than you do from having read t h e  news accounts,  The 
news accounts s a y  t ha t  it is an unmanned probe l i k e l y  t o  be 
a f l i g h t  s i m i l a r  t o  Zond 5. I r e a l l y  don't know any more 
about i t  than  that .  
QUESTXON; When you m 8 t h i s  accelerated re tu rn ,  
t h i s  58-hour 1- or is it 5 S h o u r  return- Now, as I u n d e r  
stood one of you gentlemen to  s a y ,  are you going to  be burning 
your SPS engines to get t h i s  q u i a  re turn?  
t h i s  do t o  your speed, to  your t r ans luna r  -- coming back to  
earth speed? 
And what does 
PHILLIPS: Well, the r e tu rn  t o  earthp coming out  
of lunar  orbit- The energy is added by the s e r v i c e  pro- 
puls ion s y s t e m  engine. 
i n  lunar  orbi t  and t h e  spacecraft propuls ion s y s t e m ,  t h e  
s e r v i c e  propuls ion s y s t e m  so-called, is burned t o  add approxi- 
m a t e l y  3,000 feet per second to  your ve loc i ty  i n  lunar  o rb i t ,  
which adds t h e  energy that take you on t h e  way back to  earth. 
I n  other words, you can f i n d  yourself  
The dura t ion  of t h a t  m and therefore t h e  energy 
added, t h e  number of feet per second t h a t  is added t o  ve loc i ty ,  
p l a y s  t h e  biggest  part i n  determining t h e  r e t u r n  t i m e .  
A shorter burn would provide a l o n  
and an even longer  burn than w e  plan would a 
shorter r e t u r n  t i m e .  
e t u r n  t i m e ,  
l i s h  a 
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a1 r e t u r n  t i m e ,  e get off on t i m e  
on t h i s  m i  V e r y  Close t o  urs .  And the  reentry 
second . u t  36,300 feet per 
QUESTION: Well, now, on your r e t u r n  t i m e ,  is it  
going t o  be 55 hours o r  58 hours? 
IPS: The n o ~ i n a l  r e t u r n  t i m e ,  i f  w e  get off  
ning of t h e  211st-- The r e t u r n  t i m e  I think 
i n  detail  is 57.8 hours. So I have a i d  approximately 58. 
It is a few minutes short of 58 hou 
, i f  you didn ' t  burn your SPS, you 
would be i n  a roughly 80-hour or $&hour r e t u r n  t i m e ,  wouldn't 
you, and after you leave lunar  trajectory or  lunar  orbit  you 
would more or less be going about 3,500 m i l e s  per hour un t i l .  
you get i n  p r e t t y  close to  t h e  earth and t h e  grav i ty  started 
pul l ing  you i n  there? 
Now, i n  t h i s  long haul  between t h e  moon and near 
earth, do you know what i n  m i l e s  per  hour your speed is going 
to  increase  to? 
PHILLIPS: Y e s .  1 haven't r e a l l y  broken it down 
W e  tend t o  m a k e  i n  my own mind i n  s t a t u t e  m i l e s  per hour. 
most of our  measurements i n  feet per second. 
We e n t e r  t he  earth's atmosphere at  about 400,000 
feet a t  a veloc i ty  of about 36,300 feet per second. 
somebody can te l l  you what t h a t  is i n  s t a t u t e  m i l e s  per h o u r -  
I th ink  it's about 25,500 s t a t u t e  m i l e s  per hour. 
Now, if 
We leave the moon's orbit  -= I n  other words, t h e  burn 
t h a t  w e  make to  t h e  so-called t r ansea r th  i n j e c t i o n  -- pu t s  
us  a t  a velocity-- 
I j u s t  don't have t h e  f i g u r e  i n  my head. 
I think w e  have got it on a table here. 
SCHNEIDm: YOU go on to something else and 1'11 get 
it. 
PHILLIPS: Let US look that up and come back. 
ALIBRANDO: Can we have another  quest ion? 
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0 ter w i l l  t hey  be reenter ing  Q 
t han  t h e y  would the  long t r i p  back, t h e  slower 
t r i p  back? 
PHILLIPS: Well, it is a few hundred feet per 
second. If you come back i n  a y  90 hours, which is a very 
long r e t u r n  opt ion,  your reent ry  ve loc i ty  is of t h e  order 
of 35,700 feet er second. 
which is a l i t t l e  faster than w e  are planning t o  come back, 
you would be at  l i k e  36,400 feet per second, 
If you come back i n  l i k e  55 hours,  
Sob you vary over  a few hundred feet per second i n  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  regime, 
Q ~ S T I O N :  And you can still f l y  a constant  g coming 
down? 
PRILLIPS: Y e s .  
QUESTION: So you are not overloading them because 
of t h i s  d i f f e r e n t  speed? 
PHILLIPS: No, Under any of t h e  ve loc i ty  condi t ions 
t h a t  w e  would expect t o  encounter, w e  plan t h e  4 g, constant  g,  
reent ry  deceleration, 
: I guess I should state that the  reent ry  
path t h a t  w e  are f l y i n g  was a l w a y s  one t h a t  w e  may have found 
ourselves  i n  i f  that's what t h e  computer had called for. It 
is j u s t  t h a t ' s  t h e  one w e  are t a r g e t i n g  for  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  
I n  response t o  t h e  quest ion of what our  ve loc i ty  
is after your transearth i n j e c t i o n  burn, nominally it w i l l  
be 8,865 feet per second after w e  have added t h e  3,520 foot per 
second burn on w i t h  our  SPS, Of course,  then our  reent ry  speed 
of 36,300. 
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s ,  g e t t i n g  i n t o  t h e  area 
of r i s k  again,  can you get i n t o  the  matter of a t  t h e  end of 
t h e  f l i g h t  i f  you m i s s  t h e  window can you t e l l  us what happens? 
PHILLIPS: The quest ion i if w e  m i s s  our launch 
window what happens? AB w a s  described here, the  launch 
window, which is set by -- 
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QUESTION: I mean t h e  r een t ry  windaw. In  other 
words, i f  you bounce o u t  o r  if you fa i l  t o  come i n  i n  t h i s  
corridor, what happens? 
PHILLIPS: A l l  r i gh t .  The quest ion,  a l i t t l e  d i f -  
f e r en t ,  is if w e  m i s s  t h e  r een t ry  corridor. The corridor is 
set on t h e  upper l i m i t  or  the  high s i d e  by the skip-out boundary, 
and i f  w e  m i s s  t h e  corridor on the  high s i d e  and i n  fact s k i p  
ou t ,  then it8s a spacec ra f t  and crew loss kind of s i t u a t i o n .  
The trajectory t h a t  t he  spacecraft w i l l  follow i f  
it d i d  s k i p  out  is a large ellipse, a large el l ipt ical  tra- 
jectory around t h e  earth, and t h e  t i m e  back to  eaqth is a 
matter of s e v e r a l  hours depending on the  details  of the con- 
d i t i o n  or t he  s i t u a t i o n .  And there is not  s u f f i c i e n t  electric 
power nor oxygen on board t h e  command module, because you no 
longer have t h e  s e r v i c e  module w i t h  you a t  that poin t  to sus- 
t a i n  l i f e  nor to  provide for  a subsequent reent ry .  
The lower l i m i t  of the corridor is set by t h e  high 
dece le ra t ion  l i m i t  t h a t  the  spacgcraft would be subjec ted  to  
if it came i n  too s t eep ly .  
below t h e  low s i d e  of t h e  corridor, t h e  decelerations would 
exceed about 20 g's. The hea t ing  rates w i l l  be i n  excess of 
those for which the  spacec ra f t  wz& designed, and there would 
be a s t r u c t u r a l  breakup and loss of t h e  spacecraft and the  
crew. 
And i f  t h e  spacecraft en tered  
These reent ry  condi t ions  i n  t h i s  corridor have been 
defined and described going way back s a r l y  i n t o  t h e  program. 
This reent ry  corridor was dsed on t h e  Sa turn  V f l i g h t s ,  501 
and 502, because, i f  you w i l l  recall, there w e  boasted the 
spacecraft up t o  an apogee of about 11,000 m i l e s ,  and it 
w a s  necessary for t he  s p a c e c r a f t  w i t h  its on-board guidance 
and navigat ion equipment t o  e n t e r  w i th in  t h a t  corridor or 
it would have experienced the  same th ings  t h a t  I have de- 
scr ibed here. 
B i l l  showed a couple of curves that showed what 
w e  have determined from o u r  a n a l y s i s  and test work is the  
capabi l i ty  t o  h i t  t h a t  corridor. 
respect there is r e a l l y  any r isk.  
We don't feel t h a t  i n  t h i s  
QUBSTION; I be l i eve  t h e  mean d i s t ance  of the  moon 
t o  t h e  earth i s  about 238,000 m i l e s .  On t h i s  f l i g h t  w i l l  t h e  
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moon be on t h e  close s i d e  o r  t h e  far s i d e  of t h a t  mean 
dis tance? And does that dis tance have any weight i n  your 
determination for t h e  December 21  launch? 
PHILLIPS: The d i s t a n c e  of the  earth-moon s y s t e m  
is not  a p r imary  deciding factor on the  launch window, 
The deciding factors on t h e  launch window are t h e  l i g h t i n g  
condi t ions a t  t h e  Apollo landing s i te  over  whic'h w e  intend 
t o  f l y  where w e  want l i g h t i n g  angles  of approximately or 
less than seven degrees, by a requirement for a d a y l i g h t  
launch, t h e  requirement for a day l igh t  recovery, And a l l  
of these condi t ions taken together set up t h e  t i m e  of t h e  
window that  w e  have establ ished,  
The d i s t ance  between the earth and t h e  moon is 
inc iden ta l  i n  t h i s  set of ca l cu la t ions ,  
QUESTION: Do you have there a f i g u r e  f o r  t h e  
elapsed t i m e  f r o m  lunar  i n j e c t i o n  from earth orbit  u n t i l  t h e  
t i m e  you a r r i v e  i n  luna r  o rb i t  approximately? 
SCHNEIDER: W a s  that  from TLI to  UII? 
QUESTION: Right. 
SCHNEIDER: You can do some sub t r ac t ion ,  TLI ends 
a t  2 plus  55, and U)I 1 begins a t  69 plus 11. 
QUESTION: If t h i s  f l i g h t  is completely successfu l ,  
how much t i m e  could it save  you i n  your scheduling? 
PHILLIPS: Well, t h e  qyest ion is i f  t h e  f l i g h t  is 
completely successfu l  how much t i m e  can t h i s  save  us  i n  ou r  
schedule? That's a hard quest ion to  answer i n  absolu te  terms, 
The mission sequence t h a t  w e  now plan  is t h i s  C-prime lunar  
orbit  mission on Apollo 8 ,  t h e  so-called I) mission on 
Apollo 9 -0 t h i s  is 504, Spacecraf t  104, and LM 3, which w i l l  
put  the  e n t i r e  spacecraft including t h e  luna r  module i n t o  
earth orbit  for exerc is ing  a l l  of its s y s t e m s ,  Now, beyond 
the  I) mission, w e  plan for an F mission, which is a luna r  
,orbi t  mission wi th  t h e  e n t i r e  spacecraft, including t h e  luna r  
module, including a descent to  about 50,000 feet, but not  a 
landing, rendezvous and r e t u r n  to earth. 
And beyond t h a t  w e  feel that w e ' l l  be prepared for 
t h e  lunar  landing itself, 
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uence ahead is 6-prime, 
D, F, and then a l u  t nimum sequence. 
t l y  how it goes, 
n t  for subse- 
more than one 
i n  earth orb i t  
re t o  i n d i c a t e  
 thin^, I n  t h e  weeks 
n t h e  present  
ave e v a l u ~ t e ~  our mission 
sequence to  cons i  s t ha t  w e  can accomplish 
i n  C-prime, D, F nding itself have de- 
c ided  on t h e  bas% e r a t i o n  t h a t  ill not 
e to  fly the mission w e  
used t o  ca l l  a E mission, 
as a mission i n  
which the  Sa turn  V bo raft  i n t o  earth 
orb i t ,  and then t h e  t s t he  e n t i r e  
spacecraft i n t o  an 4,000 miles1 where i n  
eva lua t ions  i n ~ o l v i n ~  t t h e  command 
s e r v i c e  module e n t l y  and together, 
conduct s e v e r a l  
We have L g and ~ Q ~ ~ ~ e r ~ n g  t h e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  w e  can acc met those t h a t  w e  can re- 
program t o  F or to  n i tself ,  concluded t h a t  w e  
w i l l  no t  r equ i r e  an S m i s ~ i o n ,  
I don't want to nclusion t h a t  C - p r i m e  
s u b s t i t u t e s  for E, ~ e c a ~ ~ ~  it. not  i n  its t o t a l i t y ,  
C-prime w i l l  accomplish c b jec t fves  t h a t  we 
had planned for E, I t  e r t a i n  of t h e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  which w i t  ave accomplished 
u n t i l  F, 
~ d ~ ~ n g  up a1 together has led u s  
t o  Pay ou t  a mainline ~ i s s i o  -11 Gprime,  D, F, 
l una r  landing -- as t h e  mini 
So, when you ou can s a y  
t h a t  w e  have sub t r ac t ed  one i o n  from t viously 
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planned sequence, t h e  16 mission, added another  which is the  
C o p r i m e ,  but t h e y  are not d i r e c t l y  a one - fo rone  tradeoff. 
O t h e r  swaps of ob jec t ives  were involved i n  the  total  process. 
Now, if I could j u s t  s a y  one more word, I feel 
w i t h  the t echn ica l  and ope ra t iona l  experience t h a t  w e  w i l l  
get  on the C-pr ime  l una r  orbit  mission t h a t  w e  w i l l ,  i n  fact, 
have shortened t h e  t i m e  t o  a manned luna r  landing by a measur  
able amount, but it's very d i f f i c u l t  to demonstrate that i n  
temns of d a y s  or weeks or months or discrete missions plus  
or minus 
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s ,  presuming you get off 
on schedule on December 21, what w i l l  be t h e  d i s t ance  of t h e  
moon from t h e  earth a t  the  poin t  of l una r  orbi t  i n se r t ion?  
And w i l l  t h e  moon be going away from the earth or heading 
toward it? 
PHILLIPS: W e l l ,  t h e  ques t ion  is how far w i l l  t h e  
moon be from t h e  earth a t  t h e  t i m e  of luna r  o rb i t  i n s e r t i o n  
if we get off on t i m e ?  And I ' m  going to have t o  get somebody 
to  look a t  a chart and f i g u r e  t h a t  out .  
SCHNEIDER: I ' l l  g i v e  you t h a t  afterwards. 
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s ,  some Russian s c i e n t i s t s  
have said t h e y  prefer t o  see an animal go around t h e  moon 
before permit t ing manned f l i g h t  i n  order to  check on r a d i a t i o n  
l e v e l s  once again. Is r a d i a t i o n ,  either local o r  solar ,  8 
specific r i s k  i n  t h i s  mission? 
PHILLIPS: Well, t he  ques t ion  bears on t h e  r a d i a t i o n  
l e v e l s  t o  be expected i n  t h i s  f l i g h t  and t h e  necess i ty  for 
an animal f l i g h t  t o  precede. 
W e  have a great deal of information, a l l  t h a t  w e  
be l i eve  we need t o  understand the  r a d i a t i o n  environment of 
t h e  earth-hoon s y s t e m ,  and these r a d i a t i o n  environments have 
been taken i n t o  account i n  t he  design of our equipment. 
The command module, for example, provides a very 
good s h i e l d  aga ins t  r ad ia t ion ,  and as you pass  through t h e  
so-called Van Allen belts around t h e  earth, for example, where 
t h e  r a d i a t i o n  l eve l8  are f a i r l y  high, t h e  command module 
by reason of the  s t r u c t u r e  and its heat s h i e l d  in su res  t h a t  
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crew is exposed to  only v 11 ~ o u n t s  of r ad ia t ion .  
t h e  v i c i n i t y  of 
hat  t h e  numbers are. 
There has  been much 
i t y  of solar f ~ a r e ~ ~  enses  a predictable 
and i n  some senses  an u rce o f  h i g h  l e v e l s  of 
r a d i a t i o n  energy, 
t h e  possibil- 
een NASA a E ~ ~ A ,  over  recent  years and months, 
we have developed a Live techniques t h a t  w e  
think are required a rn ing  of r a d i a t i o n  levels 
from solar flares t one t o  do anything d i f f e r -  
en t ly  f ind ing  himse 
A l l  02 t h e  energy s v e l s  t h a t  are concerned w i t h  
solar flares are of e u r s e l f  ou t s ide  of 
t h e  spacecraft or  i n  h as t he  luna r  
module. Those t o  which t h e  crew would be exposed i n  a command 
module are not r e a l l y  of concernc 
So X guess t h e  brie r is w e  understand t h e  
environment, our s y s t e m  has psfovi for p r e d i c t i v e  techniques 
w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  arning t i m e  solar f lare event 
don't feel t h a t  t*s ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ a r  nfrnaP t y p e  f l  
any way eva lua te  t h e  e n v ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~  
QUESTION: Bi der ,  could you te 
t h e  orbital  speed aroun ill be and a t  
tude above t h e  m o ~ n  wha ill It look l i k e  t o  t h e  three crew 
members -- the  moon, t h a t  i s 3  
3. speed is a ut 5,300 feet 
what it w i l l  look 
ending them ou t  
11 look l i k e  t h e  Lunar 
O r b i t e r  p i c t u r e s  e 
QUESTION: Canst you t uess ,  B i l l ?  W i l l  it 
be too b r igh t  to  look a t ,  for i n  W i l l  t h e y  have to  
use  sunglasses? 
you not iced our  or 
w e  do have 8 t o  look a t  t 
you are i n  t h e  sun r i g h t  
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and also t o  u n l i ~ h t  might 
be a t  the  e k a t  it from 
t h e  back as 
i s h  to accomplish 
on t h i s  m i  t ion 
We ures, and t h a t  is 
t h e  best  kno 
like t o  stress 
which d idn* t  i ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~  of 
n to our  navi- 
ss concentrat ions 
near  the  luna r  s - and much 
The a b i l i t y  L 
i n  a landing mi 
know your posit 
descent plays a grs 
And we are very 
most concerned a ve t h e  s u r f a c e  
a t  t h e  t i m e  we s 
also i n  t h e  la ter  jlth t h e  naviga- 
t ion  accuracy 
vous w i t h  t h e  
l ife-crit ical  
And i n  t sned among 
t h e  va r i ab le s  also e know t h e  
a l t i t u d e  and the a 
t navigat ion 
t racking  accuracy 
the a l t i t u d e  to the  or 
want t o  be 
Now, by trac ce over  an 
o r b i t  -- in other  the rates of 
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change of t h e  angle  can be computed such as to  determine 
w e  t h i n k  q u i t e  accura te ly  the a l t i t u d e  of t h e  orbit .  
We also w i l l  be making many measurements during 
these t e n  orb i t s  t o  eva lua te  how accurately w e  can deter- 
mine the  local ve loc i ty  and ve loc i ty  change s i t u a t i o n s ,  a l l  
of these being important. 
Now, w e  expect by the  exercise t h a t  w e  w i l l  be 
car ry ing  ou t  on t h i s  mission to  r e f i n e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the  
techniques t h a t  w i l l  then be a v a i l a b l e  to  u s  for later mis- 
s ions ,  and w e  w i l l  be doing so on a mission where w e  have 
q u i t e  a margin of propuls ive capab i l i t y ,  margin of t i m e  i f  
we need t o  use i t ,  t o  be able to  m a k e  these kinds of measure- 
ments. 
On later missions,  l i k e  t h e  F mission or t h e  luna r  
landing mission, w e ' l l  need t o  know these navigat ion parameters 
very accura te ly ,  because t h e y  w i l l  be l ife-crit ical  a c t i v i t i e s  
a t  t h a t  t i m e .  They are not l i fe-cr i t ical  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h i s  
mission, 
But I th ink  most of u s  are convinced t h a t  w e  are 
going t o  be able t o  r e f i n e  o u r  navigat ion techniques i n  very 
important w a y s  t h a t  w i l l  g ive  us  a great deal more confidence 
and probably a great deal more c e r t a i n t y  of ca r ry ing  out  a 
successfu l  mission when w e  go o u t  there w i t h  t h e  f u l l  space- 
c r a f t  and therefore have t o  be able to  do these th ings  for 
real 
QUESTION: B i l l  o r  General P h i l l i p s ,  no re ference  
was made to  t h e  poss ib i l i t y  of a s t r o n g  solar flare being 
one reason for abor t ing  t h e  mission. Is t h a t  because you 
have confidence i n  t h e  t h i c k  s h e l l  of t h e  spacecraft being 
able to  withstand even s t r o n g  solar event? 
SCHN33IDER: W e  w i l l  have our solar event s y s t e m  
I don't t h i n k  t h a t  w e  a n t i c i p a t e  anything t h a t  would up. 
be b ig  enough to  abort. However, it is a l w a y s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  it would be an abort cue, 
QUESTION: W e l l ,  what l e v e l  of threatened r a d i a t i o n  
would be involved? 
SCHNFXDER: I'm afraid I don't know r i g h t  now. I 
I don't t h i n k  w e  have a r u l e  on it can get  you t h e  number. 
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r igh t  now. 
have t o  check t h a t  for you. 
I th ink  t h e  spacecraft is adequate, but I w i l l  
QUXSTION: W i l l  one of you gentlemen 
l i t t l e  b i t  more the photographing of t he  easter 
zone? Does t h i s  i n d i c a t e ,  first of a l l ,  t h a t  t h i s  is t h e  
most promising area for  landing? And, number t w o ,  could 
you c i te  any specific areas t h e y  would photograph i n  t h i s  
zone? 
PHILLIPS: W e l l ,  w e  have selected f i v e  sites across 
t h e  face, t h e  earth s i d e ,  of t h e  moon aa t h e  Apollo landing 
sites. You w i l l  recall t h e  Apollo landing zone is along 
t h e  equator  of t h e  moon as you look a t  it  from t h e  earth 
p lus  or minus 5 degrees i n  l a t i t u d e ,  and from t h e  c e n t e r  
of t h e  f r o n t  of t h e  face as it s t ands  o u t  plus  o r  minus 45 
degrees . 
These measurements were set up by t h e  e a r l y  require- 
ments of f r ee - r e tu rn  trajectories and communications and 
navigation requirements. 
The f i v e  sites t h a t  w e  have picked are one that  is 
very close to  t h e  e a s t e r n  edge of t h i s  rectangle. It's very 
near 45 degrees. And tha t ' s  t h e  po in t  over  which w e  w i l l  
fly on t h e  seventh revolu t ion  i n  t h i s  C-p r ime  mission, 
There is another  about 15 degrees toward t h e  c e n t e r  or t o  t h e  
w e s t ,  another  very near  t h e  c e n t e r  of t h e  moon, and then there 
are t w o  i n  t h e  west, one a l i t t l e  above t h e  equator ,  and one 
a l i t t l e  below. 
A s  the year progresses, ou r  ve loc i ty  s i t u a t i o n  lets 
u s  get  more r e a d i l y  t o  a l i t t l e  north of t h e  luna r  equator  
on t h e  w e s t  q i d e  than t h e  other half  of t he  y e a r  when w e  can 
get more e a s i l y  t o  t he  southern s i t e  on t h e  w e s t  s i de .  
Now, the  photography t h a t  w e  w i l l  be car ry ing  o u t  
on t h i s  mission includes photography on t h e  back s i d e ,  
including landmark tracking. One of the  purposes of t h i s  
is to  provide geodetic -- selenographic  
t i e - i n  of the  geographic po in t s  on t h e  
the  r i g h t  word -- 
O r b i t e r  got a great deal of photography 
and mapped t scales the e n t i r e  ba 
we don't h he  data w i t h  which t o  
var ious po in t s  t o  a map. 
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Now, t h i s  photogrRphy w i l l  let  u s  do a great deal 
more of t ha t .  The photography includes stereo pairs and 
a close-time c o r e l a t i o n  as w e  track various sites, We w i l l  
be tak ing  a number of oblique photographs as w e l l .  
As you know, i n  o u r  experience o r  i n  t he  operations 
from O r b i t e r ,  w e  got a s m a l l  number of obl ique  shots,  but 
on t h i s  mission, w i t h  t h e  judgment and s e l e c t i v i t y  of t h e  
crew, w e ' l l  be tak ing  q u i t e  a number of shots t h a t  amount 
t o  t h e  approach paeh or t h e  obl ique  shots as you look forward 
or s i d e w a y s  or a f t ,  and t h i s  w i l l  be I th ink  an  invaluable  
a i d  for  t r a i n i n g  f u t u r e  crews i n  what t o  look for and what 
t o  expect,  
In  add i t ion  t o  t h a t ,  w e  w i l l  be g e t t i n g  considerable  
photography o f  the  approach path to t h e  moon. I have a l w a y s  
thought t h a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  maneuver would be a f a i r l y  e x c i t i n g  
one i f  you v i s u a l i z e  t h a t  t h e  moon is moving around the earth 
i n  t h i s  fashion ( ind ica t ing ) ,  and you are coming a t  it i n  
t h i s  fashion ( ind ica t ing ) ,  and you are going to approach it 
w i t h  s e v e r a l  thousand m i l e s  per hour of ve loc i ty  d i f f e rence ,  
and you are aiming for  a per i lune  of 60 n a u t i c a l  m i l e s  which 
you reach on t h e  back s i d e  of t h e  moon. 
t o  be quite an e x c i t i n g  period i n  t h i s  mission, 
I th ink  that 's  going 
And t h e  crew on t h i s  S l igh t  w i l l  be t ak ing  photo- 
graphy of how t he  moon looks as you come on down t h i s  trajectory. 
I th ink  t h a t  it's p r e t t y  hard t o  put a price on t h e  
value of each of these elements of ope ra t iona l  experience and 
on t h e  r e t u r n  t h a t  w e  w i l l  be able to  br ing  back i n  the  way 
of photography t o  make t h e  way easier for  eubsequent crews 
who are going to be concerned w i t h  doing a lot  more th ings  
l i k e  g e t t i n g  a LM checked out  and sepa ra t ing  and going down 
with i t , and  so on, 
ALIBRANDO: Okay. We are going t o  go t o  Houston 
now and come back here, 
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General P h i l l i p s ,  you covered 
in some detail  t h e  SPS s y s t e m  and t h e  AC bus s y s t e m ,  A t  t h e  
end of Apollo 7 you mentioned tha t  i n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  AC bus 
f a i l u r e  there w a s  one other anomaly t h a t  gave you some concern, 
and t h a t  was t h e  bat tery charger. Can you go over t h a t  a b i t ?  
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PHILLIPS: The ques t ion  is t h e  battery charger 
experience, Apollo 7 ,  I emphasized t h a t  t h a t  w a s  one of 
t h e  many th ings  that  w a s  covered i n  great detail  i n  ou r  
reviews of the  last  weeks and d a y s ,  The a b i l i t y  to  put  
energy i n t o  t h e  batteries on the  Apollo 7 mission w a s  less 
than predic ted ,  The charge rate i n  amperes w a s  lower than 
t h e  planned charge rates. 
I t  was determined r e a l l y  before Apollo 7 landed, 
but then v e r i f i e d  by t h e  spacecraft itself, that  t h e  imped- 
ance of t he  total  c i r c u i t  involving t h e  ba t te ry  and charger 
i n  t h e  spacecraft, was a f r a c t i o n  of an ohm higher  -- I have 
forgot ten  t h e  exac t  number -- than expected, This hadn't 
been properly taken account of, and it was a p l a i n  o l d  Ohm's 
l a w  matter i n  t he  end t h a t  detemnined what the charge rate w a s ,  
We subsequently have made the  necessary adjustment 
t o  t h e  charge rate such tha t  w e  w i l l  have no d i f f i c u l t y  i n  
maintaining the  batteries a t  a high charge l e v e l  on t h e  
Apollo 8 mission, 
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General, what is the  approxi- 
mate t r a i n i n g  time for  a f l i g h t  of t h i s  na ture ,  crew t r a i n i n g  
t i m e ,  and approximately how does t h a t  compare to opera t ion  
w i t h  t h e  l una r  module? 
PHILLIPS: The ques t ion  is what is t h e  approximate 
crew t r a i n i n g  t i m e  for t h i s  mission as compared to  t h e  mission 
involving t h e  l u n a r  module, I t h i n k  for t h e  record I ' l l  get 
an absolu te  number for you from Deke Slayton. As I recall, 
for  t h i s  mission we set up approximately 200 haurs of command 
s e r v i c e  module s imula tor  t i m e  as t h e  t r a i n i n g  plan,  and w e  are 
very close to  having accomplished a l l  of t h a t  planned t r a i n i n g ,  
As I remember it, the  increment t o  provide for  luna r  
module is somewhere between 50 and 100 hours a d d i t i o n a l .  
But let us  get it from Deke and g ive  it to  you SO 
you w i l l  have it accurately.  
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: How does that  break down 
i n t o  work-week t i m e ?  
PHILLIPS: I d idn ' t  understand t h e  quest ion.  
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: How does t h a t  200 hours 
work ou t  i n  terms of a work week? 
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PHILLIPS: W e l l ,  t h e  Apollo c has been working 
six dags a week, and I t h ink  their number o f  duty hours 
per week has been running 65 or 70 hours. 
usual. I think It i s  to  be expected, I t  is about t h e  kind 
of t r a i n i n g  schedule  t h a t  t h e  crews through Gemini and OUT 
crews i n  t h e  Apollo now have always followed, 
mat ' 8  not un- 
I think t h a t  t h e  nwnber of- You me, the  command 
s e r v i c e  module simulator  t i m e  per week runs about 20 hours 
per week for the prime crew and about 20 hours per week for 
the  backup crew, if I remember* Wa are running to f ive-  
hour schedules  a t  t h e  Cape i n  t he  last weekrss, The crew 
t r a ined  from s ight  i n  t he  murning u n t i l  one i n  t h e  af ternoon,  
t he  prime crew or the  backup crew uses the s imulators ,  and 
then from one u n t i l  six i n  t h e  af ternoon the  other crew usee 
t h e  s imulators .  And they  are on a sfxl-day schedule. 
QUESTION FROM HOUS!ZDNt I would gather i n  part from 
that  you are g e t t i n g  vary cloe3s t o  the p i n t  where you are 
going to have to s ta r t  t r a i n l n g  crews for miemions past  
Apollo 10, Can you te l l  w what those crave w f l l  be? 
PHILLIPS! W e l l ,  w e  have s e v e r a l  crws who are 
i n  general  t r a i n i n g  beyond Apallo 10. You know w e  have 
three CSM simulators ,  one at  Houston and t w o  a t  t h e  Cape. 
He? have two LM simulators ,  one at Houstonand one a t  the  
Cape, -- t h e  crew procedures s imulator  and several (Park) task 
trainers on which our  cram t r a i n ,  
And then there are a var i e ty  of other t r a i n i n g  devices  
The crslrfs beyond ApoZlo 9 I- and there are s e v e r a l  
a- are t r a i n i n g  for a l l  of t h e  elements t h a t  consl t i tute  a 
full lunar  landing missfon, 
We are, 88 you sayt very close t o  the time when 
specifgc mission t r a i n i n g  beyond Apollo 9 i e  going to  have 
t o  be undertaken aa a specific mission #et o f  t r a in ing ,  
So w e  a i 2 1  in the f a i r l y  near  future be announcAng 
the  specific crew s e l e c t i o n  for A p o l l o  101 
TION FROM HllUElTQPit 
was some problem wfth t h e  biomedical harness  that caused 
loss of data, and w e  were told at that t i m e  i f  a similar 
During Apollo 7 there 
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th ing  happened during t h e  mission t o  t h e  luna r  v i c i n i t y  
t h a t  the mission would be aborted and they 'd  be called 
back, And y e t  today you t e l l  u s  t h a t  i f  you lose t h e  high- 
ga in  antenna, i n  which case you could lose biomedical data, 
t h i s  would no t  be t h e  basis for ending t h e  mission. 
And, number t w o ,  what f i x  have you go t t en  on t h e  
biomedical harness? 
PHILLIPS: L e t  m e  s a y  first of a l l  t h a t  t h e  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  wi th  the biomedical harness were mainly involving 
w i r e  breakage, The small leads from the  s i g n a l  condi t ioners  
t h a t  t h e  crew wear around the i r  be l t  up to the  t ransducers  
t h a t  are taped to  var ious parts of their upper anatomy were 
I th ink  o v e r d e s i g n e d  i n  terms of f ire pro tec t ion ,  
We redesigned t h e  biomedical harness,  among t h e  many 
th ings  t h a t  w e  redesigned, t o  reduce any possible f l a m m a b i l i t y .  
And t h e  i n s u l a t i o n  on t h e  w i r e  t h a t  w e  put  i n  t o  t h a t  redesign 
and t h e  n e t  by which t h e  connections were made I th ink  turned 
ou t  t o  be an over-design i n  reducing f lammabi l i ty  and in t ro-  
duced wire s t i f f n e s s  t y p e s  of problem. So t h a t  w e  had a 
couple of ins tances  i n  Apollo 7 where these wires broke. 
Now, t h e  design of t h i s  s y s t e m  w a s  establ ished 
such t h a t  you can ' t  get s u f f i c i e n t  electrical energy i n t o  
t ha t  biomedical harness to cause a f ire problem. That ' s  been 
v e r i f i e d  and r e v e r i f i e d  many t i m e s .  So there is no real d i f -  
f i c u l t y  i n  going back to  r e a l l y  t he  Gemini t y p e  harness which 
is much more flexible. There is not  a fire problem wi th  it. 
And I t h ink  t h i s  redesign w e  went through was r e a l l y  much 
more over-cautious than  w e  needed t o  be. 
So w e  have fixed t h a t  w i r e  breakage problem i n  t h a t  
way , 
The other t h i n g  was Don E i s e l e  r epor t ing  one of t h e  
s i g n a l  condi t ioners  that he had a t  t h e  be l t  w a s  w a r m  o r  w a s  
hot to  h i s  touch. S ince  t h a t  t i m e  w e  have done a number of 
t e s t s ,have  concluded t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of moisture on a 
resistor as one possible example could cause a l i t t l e  higher  
amount of energy t o  go i n t o  that  s i g n a l  condi t ioner  but 
only t o  raise its temperature by 10 degrees, and t h a t  would 
raise it up to  something l ike l l b o r s o  degrees, which would 
feel hot o r  w a r m  to your touch, 
W e  have r e v e r i f i e d  t h a t  you can ' t  ge t  enough energy 
i n t o  t h a t  s y s t e m  to cause a fire problem. 
60 
So w e  have changed the  leads, We have rev 
t h e  basic safety of t h e  design features i n  t h e  harness and 
i n  the spacec ra f t  s y s t e m  tha t  supp l i e s  it. 
Now, t h e  biomedical data does come down on t h e  FM 
por t ion  of t h e  u n i f i e d  S-band s i g n a l ,  and i f  t h e  high-gain 
antenna is not working w e  would not expect to  be able to  
rece ive  and adequately decode t h a t  data, 
I don't recall saying nor do I remember it being 
s a i d  t h a t  w e  would abort a mission i f  w e  d idn ' t  have bio- 
medical data. W e  have given t h i s  very careful considera- 
t i o n  i n  the  previous d a y s  and are comple te ly  satisfied to 
conduct t h i s  mission w i t h  verba l  communication w i t h  t h e  
crew to  determine t h e i r  s ta te  of being, i f  w e  have t o  f a l l  
back on that  mode because w e  don't have biomedical data, 
And, accordingly,  w e  made t h e  dec is ion  t o  carry it 
out  t h a t  way i n  case w e  have d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t he  high-gain 
antenna and therefore recept ion  and recovery of the  bio- 
medical data, 
With tha t  summary, I guess B i l l  wants to s a y  some- 
thing,  
SCHNEIDER: Yes, 1 recall what you are t a l k i n g  
about,  and that  w a s  a f l i g h t  surgeon's recommended f l i g h t  
r u l e  on a luna r  landing mission. And I has ten  to add w e  
haven't w r i t t e n  those r u l e s  y e t ,  
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: Earlier, General P h i l l i p s  , 
I be l ieve  you s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  mission i n t o  the luna r  v i c i n i t y  
would shor ten  t h e  t i m e  for lunar  landing by a measurable 
amount. Could you t e l l  u s  what t h a t  measurable amount would 
be? 
PHILLIPS: I think I have already t o l d  you I don't 
know how t o  de f ine  it i n  dollars, cen t s ,  days ,  weeks, or 
months , 
J u s t  t o  s a y  again b r i e f l y ,  w i t h  t he  t echn ica l  data 
w e  w i l l  ob n on t h i s  mission t h a t  has  to  do wi th  the per- 
navigat ion information w e  w i l l  get, w e  w i l l  be able to  proceed 
any of ou r  s y s t e m s  and maneuvers, w i t h  t h e  
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w i t h  much greater confidence and assurance w i t h  each of t he  
missions ahead, where i n  an F or G mission, for example, w e  
don't expect to  have the  margins of t i m e  and p rope l l an t s  t o  
be able to  do some of the  eva lua t ions  and ob ta in  some of 
t h e  data that w e  can o b t a i n  here. 
I t  may be p a r t l y  i n t u i t i v e  or judgmental, but I am 
convinced t h a t  t h i s  mission w i l l  sho r t en  up o u r  series, and 
I suppose i f  I had to  put  a t i m e  on it I 'd s a y  by t h e  order 
of three months. 
QUESTION FROM CAPE XENNEDY: This is t h e  Cape. W e  
have some quest ions here. General P h i l l i p s ,  t h i s  is Sue Butler.  
Could you t e l l  us ,  please, whether o r  not  t h e  a s t ronau t s  i n  
Apollo 7 monitored t h e  en t ry  monitoring s y s t e m  where t h e  
range c a l c u l a t i o n  w a s  not  working? D i d  they monitor? And 
then when you got it back and examined it, j u s t  what w a s  
wrong w i t h  it and how d i d  you f i x  it? 
PHILLIPS: The en t ry  monitor s y s t e m  on Apallo 7 ,  
t h e  range-measuring f e a t u r e  of it, w a s  no t  opera t ing  properly 
on the  reent ry  on Apollo 7 0  It turned ou t  i n  post-mission 
eva lua t ion  t h a t  t h e  scroll  po r t ion  of t h e  e n t r y  monitoring 
s y s t e m  w a s  working properly. We have had t h e  101 spacecraft 
a t  Downey under var ious s y s t e m  tests involving being i n  a 
power depth mode s i n c e  w e  got it back, and a t  least as of 
y e s t e r d a y  w e  had not y e t  removed t h e  en t ry  monitor s y s t e m  
box from t h e  spacecraft t o  d i g  i n t o  i t  and f i n d  ou t  i n  
d e t a i l  what t h a t  malfunction that  w e  reported before w e  took 
off r e a l l y  w a s .  
I expect w e  w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  it is an open of t h e  
t y p e  w e  theorized before w e  f l e w .  
The scroll can be taken o u t  of t h e  EMS separately. 
I t  does look l i k e  a t  t h i s  t i m e  the  scroll po r t ion  was 
working properly. 
We have an en t ry  monitor s y s t e m  i n  t h e  103 space- 
craft which is i n  good condition. W e  th ink one of t h e  
reasons w e  had the  t r o u b l e  w e  d i d  w i t h  the  101 Elbps is be- 
cause i n  t h e  months preceding the  f l i g h t  there were q u i t e  
a few modif icat ions put  i n t o  it, reworks, and w i t h  complex 
e l e c t r o n i c  equipment one can m a k e  problems w i t h  mu l t ip l e  
' reworks, and t h a t  is one of t h e  reasons w e  t r y  t o  avoid it. 
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The one i n  t h e  103 has n o t  been reworked i n  t h i s  way. 
beside t h a t ,  it has been checked ou t  properly i n  a l l  t h e  
checkouts, 60 w e  think w e  have got a good one. 
And, 
But w e  are saying now for some t i m e  t h a t  w e  do not  
require mandatorily t h e  en t ry  monitor s y s t e m  for  103 mission, 
The p r i m a r y  mode of r een te r ing  is w i t h  t h e  spacecraft guid- 
ance and navigat ion s y s t e m ,  The f i r s t  backup mode is w i t h  
t h e  e n t r y  monitor s y s t e m ,  The t h i r d  backup mode is optical 
s i g h t i n g s  and the constant  g r een t ry  t h a t  B i l l  described. 
With these series of backup modes w e  are r e a l l y  not concerned 
on t h i s  +prime mission whether t h e  EMS works or not. 
I don't want to s a y  t h a t  too negatively.  We expect 
it to work. We think t h a t  t h i s  one w i l l ,  W e  are protected 
aga ins t  a f a i l u r e ,  however, i n  case such a f a i l u r e  occurs, 
QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question for General 
P h i l l i p s  or B i l l  Schneider. Two quest ions a c t u a l l y ,  One, 
I understand there is no sk ip  reent ry  as you describe it ,  but 
the quest ion is why are you choosing t h i s  rou te  ins tead  of 
what w e  understood t o  be a direct s k i p  reent ry?  
The other quest ion,  you have mentioned s e v e r a l  t i m e s  
t h e  high-gain antenna, t h i s  being t h e  f i r s t  t i m e .  Do you 
t h i n k  it w i l l  work or  has  t e s t i n g  shown you may have t roub le  
w i t h  it? 
PHILLIPS: Let m e  answer t h e  second ques t ion  first, 
We have had some d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  electromechanical con t ro l  
portions of t h e  high-gain antenna i n  our q u a l i f i c a t i o n  test-  
ing a t  t h e  vendor's f a c i l i t y ,  These d i f f i c u l t i e s  d i d  lead 
u s  a 9ew months ago to  introduce some design changes t o  over- 
come those qua l  f a i l u r e s .  
Those design changes were not  a v a i l a b l e  t o  be put  
i n t o  the equipment that  is now aboard the  103 spacecraft for 
t h i s  mission, 
The high-gain antenna and a l l  of its c o n t r o l  equip- 
ment were i n s t a l l e d  a t  t h e  Cape back i n  September as I recall, 
I t  was checked o u t  f u l l y  i n  a l l  of its c o n t r o l  modes as w e l l  
as its RF modes. It worked properly. And at  that  point  
t h e  equipment w a s  stowed, because, as you know, it takes 
off i n s i d e  t h e  s k i r t  of t h e  s e r v i c e  module. So it  w a s  stowed. 
The next t i m e  we w i l l  see that  equipment is after t r ans luna r  
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i n j e c t i o n  when the  spacecraft separates, and t h i s  antenna 
can be checked out.  
We expect t h i s  equipment t o  work because it has 
passed its checkout and w a s  working properly a t  the  t i m e  
w e  stowed it after checkout. 
Now, w e  are mindful of the  poasibi l i ty  of f a i l u r e s ,  
because w e  d i d  f i n d  c e r t a i n  small but important design de= 
f i c i e n c i e s  during t h e  l a t te r  part of t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  test- 
ing which are being f ixed  i n  later models. 
And a l l  of t h i s  is one of t he  reason63 why w e  have 
given considerable  e x t r a  a t t e n t i o n  to t h e  high-gain antenna 
and have been able to  provide for an adequate and safe mission 
all t he  way through t h e  mission even i f  it doesn't work. 
The other ques t ion  is why are w e  f l y i n g  a constant  g 
reentry? I answered it i n  part before -- namely, t h a t  t h a t  
provides us a simple, e f f e c t i v e ,  reliable t h i r d  backup for  
t h e  guidance and c o n t r o l  reent ry  mode or t h e  e n t r y  monitor 
system reent ry  mode. 
You know, i t  is obvious as you proceed through 
a major development program which is developing equipment 
and ope ra t iona l  techniques t h a t  you l e a r n  a lot .  That is 
one of the  reasons you do it ,  one of the  reasons why w e  go 
through a l l  of these progress ive  steps. I t h i n k  one of t h e  
th ings  t ha t  w e  have i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the reasonably recent  past  
is t h a t  w e  have got a considerable  margin i n  ou r  r een t ry  
s y s t e m .  
I won't g ive  you an  exact figure, but I th ink  o u r  
heat s h i e l d  is capable of r een te r ing  a t  probably up t o  or  
maybe even greater than 40,000 feet a second. T h i s  mission 
is programmed a t  36,300 roughly. 
of margin there. 
So there is a great deal 
The reen t ry  g's can go w e l l  above 4 without r a i s i n g  
any reason for concern. The design l i m i t  as you know is 
20 . 
I t h i n k  i n  s tudying  t h e  e n t i r e  ope ra t ion  and t h e  
r een t ry  regime i n  p a r t i c u l a r  over  t he  last s e v e r a l  months, 
our people have come to  t h e  conclusion t h a t  t h i s  constant  
g reent ry  which gets you down to  sub-c i r cu la r  speeds f a i r l y  
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r a p i d l y  so t h a t  you can ' t  s k i p  ou t  is maybe t h e  way w e  
w i l l  go on a l l  ou r  missions. 
The previous technique of skipping -- w e l l ,  not  
skipping out  but coming i n t o  atmosphere then  going back 
ou t  for a period of cool ing -9 r e a l l y  i s n ' t  required.  So 
w e  are able i n  t h i s  mission to  introduce what w e  on balance 
feel is a t h i r d  backup mode t o  our  total  r een t ry  s y s t e m  
which doesn't br ing w i t h  it any other problems or  concerns, 
and i n  t h e  whole p i c t u r e  it's probably a safer r een t ry  s y s t e m .  
And it may w e l l  be that that  w i l l  be what w e  w i l l  
use  on a l l  of ou r  deep space r e e n t r i e s ,  
QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question for  General 
Ph i l l i p s .  How long is t h e  crew subjec ted  t o  t h a t  4-g environ- 
ment, and are t h e y  capable during t h i s  t i m e  period to manually 
con t ro l  t h e  r een t ry  i f  necessary? 
PHILLIPS: They are capable of manually c o n t r o l l i n g  
the r een t ry  a t  any poin t  dur ing  t h e  e n t i r e  reentry.  The 
period a t  which t h e y  w i l l  be a t  4 g's is of t h e  order of one- 
and-a-ha.lf minutes. 
QUESTION*FROM CAPE KGNNEDY: If you for some reason 
dec ide  not  to  go i n  luna r  o rb i t  and you cont inue i n t o  free- 
r e t u r n  circumlunar f l i g h t ,  how close w i l l  you come to  the  
moon? And another  t h ing  I wasn't qu i te  clear on is how many 
of t h e  f i v e  sites do you p lan  to  photograph? 
PHXLLIPS: We p lan  to  photograph one of the  f i v e  
Apollo landing eites. You remember the l i g h t i n g  for  t h i s  
mission w i l l  be correct for  t h e  easternmost of these sites, 
so w e  w i l l  photograph one. 
I 'm  s o r r y  I fo rgo t  t h e  first half  of your quest ion.  
Would you repeat it? 
QUESTION FFtOM CAPE KENNEDY: Y e s ,  If you cont inue  
j u s t  on f ree- re turn  circumlunar f l i g h t ,  how close can you 
come to  the  moon? 
PHILLIPS: S ix ty  n a u t i c a l  m i l e s  is t h e  p lan  for  t h e  
nominal approach d i s t ance  on a circumlunar t y p e  mission. 
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I poin t  o u t  that- Well, tha t  would be the  approach 
d i s t ance  or t h e  closest w e  would come if, for example, t h e  
dec is ion  were made to  not  m a k e  the  l u n a r  orbi t  i n s e r t i o n  
burn as a last-minute dec is ion ,  because t h a t  would be t h e  
poin t  a t  which you would approach, 
But 1 would poin t  ou t  t h a t  i f  w e  made the  dec is ion  
some hours or many hours earlier, t h e  total  set of circum- 
s t ances  might cause us t o  raise t h a t  pe r i lune  t o  some greater 
he ight  which would be f a i r l y  e a s y  for us  t o  do, So t h a t  
f l e x i b i l i t y  is one t h a t  might be exerc ised  i n  real-time 
depending on total  circumstances, 
ALIBRANDO: Okay. We have been going for  three 
hours. Does anybody here have another  quest ion? 
QUESTXQN: One quick one, What is t h e  i n c l i n a t i o n  
of t h e i r  o r b i t  around t h e  moon? 
SCHNEIDBR: Twelve degrees. 
ALIBRANW: Okay. W e  have a quote  from Frank Bornan 
i n  t r a i n i n g  a t  t h e  Cape, If you w i l l  bear w i t h  us, w e  w i l l  
read t h a t .  H e  s a y s :  
' W e  have been t r a i n i n g  very hard for t h i s  f l i g h t ,  
and wetre happy t h a t  t h e  performance of Apollo 7 and other 
cons idera t ions  t h a t  l ed  t o  t h i s  dec is ion  permit u s  to  go." 
Okay,  So much for  t h e  press conference. The 
t r a n s c r i p t  w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  tomorrow morning i n  t h e  newsroom. 
If you want i t  mailed t o  you, f i l l  ou t  an envelope, The 
photographs showing t h e  Apollo 8 orbi ta l  plannfng are ava i l -  
a b l e  i n  L e s  Gaverts office, 
(Whereupon, a t  1:10 p.m,, the  press conference 
was concluded. 
* * *  
